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Judgment which bends with the political winds cannot command 
much confidence in the Court, nor are claims of industrial ex-
perience and expertise under such circumstances given full faith 
and credit.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or “Board”) is a colle-
gial administrative body whose adjudications are not significantly 
tainted by the blight of political bias. Nonetheless, most commenta-
tors assume that the Board engages in politically motivated deci-
sionmaking because of the natural affinity between conservative Re-
publican Board Members and employers on the one hand, and liberal 
Democratic Board Members and unions and individual employees on 
the other.2  
 Yet, this Article’s empirical study of agency adjudication3 at the 
NLRB—involving a comprehensive examination of all Board cases 
implementing the highly indeterminate inherently-destructive-
                                                                                                                    
 1. Clyde Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J. 59, 86 
(1965) (referring to the National Labor Relations Board).  
 2. See, e.g., Joan Flynn, “Expertness For What?”: The Gould Years at the NLRB and 
the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 474-77 (2000) 
[hereinafter Flynn, Expertness For What] (arguing that it is difficult for Board Members 
who have usually made their careers representing either labor or management to render 
unbiased opinions on issues of national labor policy, especially since they will be returning 
to their former practices after they have completed their Board stints); Joan Flynn, A Quiet 
Revolution at the Labor Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1361, 1398 (2000) [hereinafter Flynn, Quiet Revolution] (maintaining that partisan 
Board appointments have become the norm at the NLRB over the last thirty years); Wil-
liam Priest, Collective Bargaining for Nurses Under the National Labor Relations Act: A 
Look at the Future, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 277, 299 (1995) (maintaining that the NLRB engages 
in politically biased adjudications); Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explana-
tion of Inconsistent Results, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1713, 1724-25 (1981) (same).  
 3. Administrative agencies set policy in one of two ways: through adjudication of in-
dividual disputes or through the promulgation of regulations through notice and comment 
procedures. See generally RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 402 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing the legislative and adjudicatory models of admin-
istrative agency decisionmaking). Although politics can and do properly play a significant 
role in the promulgation of regulations by administrative agencies, see Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864-66 (1984), impartiality is sup-
posed to be one of the bedrock principles of agency adjudication. See Administrative Proce-
dures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2000).  
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conduct standard4—convincingly suggests otherwise. Instead, it ap-
pears that Board Members are able to overcome their ideological bi-
ases and arrive at a surprising number of consistent decisions in or-
der to foster the institutional integrity of their organization.5 This 
Article posits that the concept of institutional collegiality, developed 
by Judge Harry T. Edwards in the domain of federal appellate court 
decisionmaking,6 helps best explain how this counterintuitive result 
is possible in the midst of a purportedly partisan agency environ-
ment7 and under circumstances where amorphous legal standards8 
would appear to permit the most aggressive forms of political adjudi-
cation.9  
 The ramifications of these empirical findings are at least three-
fold. First, if Board Members do not consider their own political in-
terests in making inherently-destructive-conduct determinations, the 
Board gains stature not only in the eyes of the Supreme Court and 
other reviewing courts, as Professor Summers has observed,10 but 
                                                                                                                    
 4. See infra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra Part V.D. 
 6. See generally Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. 
Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1358-62 (1998); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality 
on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, Effects 
of Collegiality]; Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Princi-
pled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 852-59 (1991). As will be explored in more 
depth below, by collegiality, Judge Edwards does not mean that all judges must be friends; 
rather, these judges attempt to get the law right by communicating with, listening to, and 
ultimately influencing one another to push their ideological preferences to the side for the 
sake of their common interest in maintaining the integrity of their institution. Edwards, 
Effects of Collegiality, supra, at 1644-45. 
 7. Recent studies of Board Member voting behavior by Professor Joan Flynn indicate 
that certain Board Members had perfect, or near perfect, pro-management or pro-union 
voting records in cases where at least one Member dissented. See Flynn, Expertness For 
What, supra note 2, at 484 (noting that Member Hurtgen, in cases in which at least one 
Board Member dissented, had a perfect 61-0 pro-management voting record and that 
Member Browning had a 97-2 pro-union voting record in similar cases). For a critique of 
these studies, see infra note 261.  
 8. But see Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding The Ball”: NLRB Policy-
making and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 393-99 (1995) [hereinafter 
Flynn, Hiding The Ball] (arguing that there are a number of Board legal standards that 
sound flexible, but which the Board applies in a rigid, near absolute fashion).  
 9. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1640-41. Most prior theoreti-
cal expositions of the inherently-destructive-conduct standard have narrowly focused on 
this legal standard in a vacuum without such understandings being grounded in the real-
ity of how the Board has actually applied the inherently-destructive-conduct standard in 
practice. See Michael H. LeRoy, Institutional Signals and Implicit Bargains in the ULP 
Strike Doctrine: Empirical Evidence of Law as Equilibrium, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 173 
(1999) [hereinafter LeRoy, Institutional Signals] (observing that most scholarly legal lit-
erature “makes no use of empirical data to test conclusions” and is “limited by its tendency 
to reach conclusions based on a textual reading of lead cases”); see also Daniel M. Schnei-
der, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax 
Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 325 (2001) (“There has been little empirical research in tax 
law about judges, and none that explains how they interpret the code.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 10. See Summers, supra note 1, at 86.  
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also increases its credibility in the eyes of labor and management 
groups that appear before it.11 Second, such consistent adjudicative 
outcomes assist parties in planning their future conduct and predict-
ing the legality of their conduct,12 thereby fostering a more construc-
tive labor relations environment throughout the country. Third, and 
perhaps most significantly, this empirical study suggests that insti-
tutional collegiality is playing a central and pivotal role in adminis-
trative agency adjudications.13 And although one study should not be 
interpreted too broadly, by establishing that Board Members are suc-
cessfully able to act in a collegial manner by separating their political 
ideologies from their institutional roles and by seeking to get the law 
right, this Article confirms that agency adjudication can indeed play 
a valuable role in protecting the increasing number of individuals 
who seek vindication of their rights in front of these administrative 
tribunals.  
 This Article is divided into six parts. Part II lays out the doctrinal 
framework surrounding the inherently-destructive-conduct standard. 
Part III sets forth the methodology utilized in the empirical analysis 
of the Board’s inherently-destructive-conduct decisions. Part IV re-
ports the relevant findings of this empirical analysis. Part V ad-
vances four primary conclusions based upon the findings of the em-
pirical analysis; most importantly, that institutional collegiality 
plays a central role in explaining the dynamics of administrative 
agency adjudication. Part VI provides a short conclusion. 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Board decisions driven by political considerations negate the Board’s claim of su-
periority in deciding labor disputes based on industrial experience and expertise and com-
promise its stature as a neutral independent agency. See JAMES A. GROSS, THE RESHAPING 
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION, 
1937-1947, at 262 (1981) (“The integrity and legitimacy of the NLRB are dependent upon 
maintenance of a proper balance of quasi-judicial independence, public accountability, and 
administrative responsiveness to the changing realities of industrial and labor relations.”). 
Indeed, if parties do not believe they can receive impartial justice from the NLRB, they 
might not even bother with the NLRB. See Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspec-
tive of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 RUTGERS L.J. 269, 390 n.620 (1985) (observing that as a 
result of the right-wing character of the Reagan Board, many labor officials and lawyers is-
sued a call to avoid the NLRB and even advocated repealing the National Labor Relations 
Act altogether). 
 12. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, Note, The National Labor Relations Board at 50: 
Politicization Creates Crisis, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 244 (1986). 
 13. Like Judge Edwards, this Article does not argue that collegiality is the “holy grail” 
of Board decisionmaking; rather, it maintains that such collegiality assists in one’s under-
standing of how the Board, and other adjudicative agencies, are able to achieve decisional 
consistency in highly partisan environments. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra 
note 6, at 1643. 
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II.   THE DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK 
A.   The Wagner Act of 1935 
 In response to the growing disparity in economic power between 
management and labor, which became especially apparent during 
the Depression, Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act 
of 1935 (NLRA or “Act”).14 Also called the Wagner Act after its chief 
congressional sponsor, Senator Robert Wagner of New York,15 the Act 
was intended to support employee rights to organize and to engage in 
the process of collective bargaining through representatives of their 
own choosing.16 Congress found that the denial of these organiza-
tional and collective bargaining rights in the past had led to indus-
trial strife, the obstruction of interstate commerce, and the depres-
sion of wage rates and the purchasing power of workers.17  
 The heart of the National Labor Relations Act is section 7, which 
grants all employees the following rights: “the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to en-
gage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.”18  These rights enumer-
ated in section 7 were considered crucial to establish a balance of 
bargaining power between employees and their employers.19  
 To protect these newly promulgated section 7 rights, Congress 
prohibited certain employer practices as unfair labor practices under 
section 8 of the Act.20 The enforcement of these unfair labor practice 
provisions was placed in a newly formed independent administrative 
                                                                                                                    
 14. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)). See generally 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 24-
26 (Patrick Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW].  
 15. Although he faced almost overwhelming opposition by industry to the NLRA and 
lukewarm support by the President, Senator Wagner has been credited with single-
handedly “deliver[ing] modern American labor law” in the form of the NLRA. See 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 26. 
 16. See 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 
45 (1937) (“The theory of the Act is that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited 
representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and may bring about the 
adjustments and agreements which the Act in itself does not attempt to compel.”).  
 17. 29 U.S.C. § 151; see also Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 42.  
 18. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 19. See NLRB v. United Rubber Workers, 269 F.2d 694, 697 (4th Cir. 1959) (“The ba-
sic purpose of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, as shown by the preamble con-
tained in § 1, was to protect the right of employees to organize for the purpose of collective 
bargaining so that they might have equal bargaining powers with their employers . . . .”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 362 U.S. 329 (1960).  
 20. Unfair labor practices are those employer practices that impede employee organ-
izational efforts or interfere with a union’s ability to represent the interests of its mem-
bers. See 29 U.S.C. § 158; Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 799 (1945). 
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agency, the National Labor Relations Board.21 By placing the en-
forcement mechanism of the Act within the NLRB, Congress ex-
pected that experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the 
complexities surrounding industrial relations would make the deci-
sions that would shape national labor policy.22  
 Two unfair labor practice provisions in particular are of signifi-
cance in relation to the inherently destructive standard: section 
8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3).23 Unfair labor practice cases under section 
8(a)(1) are decided on the basis of whether employer conduct imper-
missibly interferes with, coerces, or restrains employees in the exer-
cise of their section 7 rights.24 Generally, in these cases, the Board 
weighs an employer’s economic interests in running its business as it 
sees fit against employees’ statutory interests protected under sec-
tion 7, such as the right to organize and to determine whether the 
employer’s conduct impermissibly interferes with employees’ rights 
under the Act.25 Importantly, employer intent plays no role in section 
8(a)(1) cases.26  
 On the other hand, intent is central to the discrimination provi-
sions under section 8(a)(3).27 In section 8(a)(3) cases, the NLRB is re-
quired to find an act of employer discrimination which has been mo-
tivated28 by anti-union intent29 and has a foreseeable effect of either 
                                                                                                                    
 21. Sections 3 through 6 of the Act describe the structure and the powers of the 
NLRB. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-156. In addition, section 10(a) of the Act states in pertinent 
part: “The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce.” Id. § 
160(a); see also Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 798.  
 22. See Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 800; see also Flynn, Hiding the Ball, supra note 
8, at 416.  
 23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). Although under the Wagner Act the interference provi-
sions were initially codified as section 8(1) and the discrimination provisions as section 
8(3), the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947 recodified these sections as sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(3). The language of section 8(1) and 8(a)(1), and of section 8(3) and 8(a)(3), is identical 
in all pertinent respects, and therefore these sections are referred to as 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) 
for convenience throughout this Article. See Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 44 
(1954).  
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  
 25. See, e.g., Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 803 (balancing the property interest of 
employers against the organizational interests of employees to distribute union literature 
on the employer’s premises during nonwork hours and in nonwork areas and finding sec-
tion 8(a)(1) violations because employee interests outweighed employer interests). 
 26. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) (“A 
violation of § 8(a)(1) alone . . . presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a dis-
criminatory motive.”). 
 27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).  
 28. Following the practice of other commentators, the terms “motive” and “intent,” al-
though distinguishable under some circumstances, will be used interchangeably through-
out this Article. See Thomas G.S. Christensen & Andrea H. Svanoe, Motive and Intent in 
the Commission of Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 
77 YALE L.J. 1269, 1271 n.4 (1968); Walter E. Oberer, The Scienter Factor in Sections 
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Labor Act: Of Balancing, Hostile Motive, Dogs and Tails, 52 CORNELL 
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encouraging or discouraging union membership in any labor organi-
zation.30 Anti-union intent in section 8(a)(3) cases may be established 
in one of two ways: through specific evidence of unlawful intent31 or 
through inference resulting from the very nature of the conduct it-
self.32 As will be discussed in more detail below, the United States 
Supreme Court has subsequently characterized indicia of unlawful 
intent as “inherently destructive conduct,” and specific evidence of 
intent is not required.33    
 By mechanistically insisting on intent playing a role in inher-
ently-destructive-conduct cases, the Supreme Court has placed the 
Board in the difficult analytical position of having to characterize the 
employer’s state of mind, never an easy task in any area of the law. 
Indeed, Board Members appear to be granted almost unlimited dis-
cretion to divine the intent behind an employer’s actions.34 The fol-
lowing brief narrative describes the route by which the Supreme 
Court arrived at this unfortunate doctrinal “Alice in Wonderland.”35  
                                                                                                                    
L.Q. 491, 504-05 (1967); Rebecca Hanner White, Modern Discrimination Theory and the 
National Labor Relations Act, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 99, 140 n.229 (1997).  
 29. See Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954) (“The relevance of the 
motivation of the employer in such discrimination has been consistently recognized under 
both § 8(a)(3) and its predecessor.”).  
 30. See id. at 42-43.  
The language of § 8(a)(3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an 
employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. 
Thus this section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement of 
membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimina-
tion is prohibited. Nor does this section outlaw discrimination in employment 
as such; only such discrimination as encourages or discourages membership in 
a labor organization is proscribed.  
Id.  The Supreme Court has made clear that the phrase “membership in any labor organi-
zation” in the statutory language also more generally includes discouraging or encouraging 
participation in union activities. See id. at 39-40. 
 31. This Article does not deal with the vast majority of section 8(a)(3) cases decided 
based on specific evidence, either direct or circumstantial, establishing anti-union motiva-
tion on the part of the employer. These cases, generally decided under the Board’s decision 
in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), do not in-
volve employer conduct which is inherently destructive of employer rights (for example, 
cases involving the hiring or firing of individual employees). As a result, these cases re-
quire an affirmative showing of anti-union purpose on the employer’s part. See 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 250.   
 32. See Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 44-45 (“[S]pecific evidence of intent to en-
courage or discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 8(a)(3). . . . 
Both the Board and the courts have recognized that proof of certain types of discrimination 
satisfies the intent requirement.”).  
 33. Inherently-destructive-conduct cases generally involve employer conduct in re-
sponse to concerted union activity. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 
26, 33 (1967); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1963).  
 34. Characterizing the employer’s state of mind in these cases has been criticized as a 
needless “fictive formality.” Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); see also Joan Baker, NLRA Section 8(a)(3) and the Search for a National Labor Pol-
icy, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 71, 97 (1989); Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1327. 
 35. See generally LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Selwyn H. 
Goodacre ed., 1982). 
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B.   Section 8(a)(3) Cases Under the Wagner Act 
1.   NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 
 Almost immediately after its enactment, the NLRA was chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds in the United States Supreme 
Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.36 After upholding the 
constitutionality of the NLRA under a liberal reading of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power,37 the Court considered the discrimination 
aspects of the case under section 8(a)(3).38  
 In finding a violation under section 8(a)(3) of the Act, the Supreme 
Court observed that although “[t]he Act does not interfere with the 
normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or 
to discharge them,” nevertheless, “[t]he employer may not, under 
cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to 
their self-organization and representation.”39 In other words, “[t]he 
true purpose [of the employer] is the subject of [the] investigation.”40 
Because the Supreme Court determined that the true purpose of the 
employer’s actions against the employees in Jones & Laughlin was to 
discourage union membership, the employer was found to have com-
mitted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3).41 
2.   NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. 
 The following year, the Supreme Court again considered section 
8(a)(3) in the well-known case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele-
graph Co.42 In Mackay Radio, the company responded to strike activ-
ity on the part of its employees by replacing them during the strike 
with new employees and then by refusing to displace these replace-
ments once the strike had ended.43 The employer maintained that it 
                                                                                                                    
 36. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The evidence presented at the Board hearing established that 
the employer, a large steel company, had fired ten active union members for attempting to 
organize its Aliquippa, Pennsylvania facility. Id. at 28. 
 37. Id. at 41-43.  
 38. The complaint also alleged a violation of section 8(a)(1). Nonetheless, “it has been 
universally recognized that any violation of [Section 8(a)(3)] must also, automatically, con-
stitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1).” Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1324; see 
also White, supra note 28, at 105 (“When an employer commits an unfair labor practice 
under any section of the NLRA, that misconduct also violates section 8(a)(1) derivatively 
because an unfair labor practice will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise of their section 7 rights.”). 
 39. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 45-46.  
 40. Id. at 46.  
 41. Id. 
 42. 304 U.S. 333 (1938). 
 43. See id. at 338-39. Additionally, even after the replacement workers vacated their 
positions so that those positions became available, the company refused to reinstate the 
five strikers who were the most active union members. Id. at 339. In this regard, and con-
sistent with Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court found that because the employer’s true 
purpose was to discourage union membership by failing to rehire the five most active union 
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had permanently replaced the strikers not for any anti-union rea-
sons, but for the legitimate reason of continuing its business opera-
tions during the strike.44 
 Mackay Radio, therefore, represented a classic case of union dis-
couragement without specific evidence of discrimination.45 At this 
point in the doctrinal development of section 8(a)(3), however, the 
Court was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to infer the necessary 
unlawful intent from the sheer colossal effect such action had on the 
strikers and their union.46 The problem for the Court was that in the 
absence of specific evidence of anti-union intent, it was extremely dif-
ficult to determine which motivation played the dominant role in de-
termining the employer’s conduct vis-à-vis its striking workers.47  
 Apparently reluctant to engage in this intricate analytical exer-
cise, the Supreme Court avoided the issue lurking in Mackay Radio 
and instead was contented to assume there was no unlawful dis-
crimination under section 8(a)(3) based on the employer’s mere prot-
estations of innocence.48 Inferring anti-union intent from the injuri-
ous consequences of employer conduct on employee rights under the 
Act would have to wait another day.  
3.   Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB 
 Indeed, it was not until seven years later, in Republic Aviation 
Corp. v. NLRB,49 that the Court appeared tentatively to take this 
next step and find a section 8(a)(3) violation in a case where specific 
evidence of unlawful employer intent was lacking. In Republic Avia-
tion, there were two instances of employees being terminated for en-
gaging in union solicitation activities in violation of two different 
companies’ strictly enforced no-solicitation policies.50 Having found 
that the companies’ no-solicitation policies violated section 8(a)(1) by 
impermissibly interfering with employees’ section 7 rights to organ-
                                                                                                                    
members, such actions amounted to an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3). Id. at 
347.   
 44. Id. at 337.  
 45. See Bernard D. Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 91 (1965).  
 46. Professor Meltzer has pointed out that the difference between replacing a striking 
employee and discharging him is artificial at best. For the employee, “the critical fact is the 
loss of a job as a result of engaging in protected activities. That loss, whether brought on by 
an unlawful act of discharge or by a lawful replacement, might substantially discourage 
employees from exercising their right to strike in the future.” Id.  
 47. See id. at 92. (“[I]t would be a heroic task to determine whether, from the em-
ployer’s point of view, the dominant significance of replacements was their impact on pro-
duction or their impact on bargaining and on the union’s representative status.”). More-
over, compounding the dilemma of intent is the fact “the employer’s interest in solving [op-
erational] problems [caused by a strike] coincides with his interest in blunting the effec-
tiveness of union bargaining pressures.” Id.  
 48. See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46.  
 49. 324 U.S. 793 (1945). 
 50. See id. at 794-97. 
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ize,51 the Court then found “that if a rule against solicitation is inva-
lid as to union solicitation on the employer’s premises during the 
employee’s own time, a discharge because of violation of that rule 
discriminates within the meaning of Section 8[(a)](3) in that it dis-
courages membership in a labor organization.”52  
 Republic Aviation’s innovation was that there could be an unfair 
labor practice under section 8(a)(3) in the absence of specific evidence 
of employer anti-union intent. As a Supreme Court Justice explained 
in a subsequent section 8(a)(3) case: “A finding of [employer] motiva-
tion [in Republic Aviation] . . . [was] unnecessary because there was 
no employer showing of a nondiscriminatory purpose for applying the 
rule to union solicitation during the employees’ free time.”53 The 
seeds of the inherently destructive standard had thus been sown.54 
C.   The Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947 
 In the midst of the development of section 8(a)(3) jurisprudence, 
Congress enacted the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (also 
known as the Taft-Hartley Amendments).55 Responding to concerns 
that the Wagner Act’s statutory scheme was tilted too far in favor of 
unions,56 Congress amended key sections of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act with the passage of Taft-Hartley.57 The federal government 
made a clear shift in labor relations policy with Taft-Hartley by in-
                                                                                                                    
 51. See supra note 25.  
 52. Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 805. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has recently read Republic Aviation as an anomalous case, “stand[ing] for the limited 
proposition that if an employer adopts an illegal rule . . . and then fires an employee for 
[violating] the rule, it[s conduct] automatically violates [section] 8(a)(3) even though it 
adopted the rule for [nondiscriminatory] reasons.” Contractors’ Labor Pool, Inc. v. NLRB, 
323 F.3d 1051, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 53. See Local 357, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 680 (1961) (Harlan, 
J., concurring); see also Oberer, supra note 28, at 507 (interpreting Republic Aviation to 
hold that employer conduct can carry its own indicia of unlawful intent “where the em-
ployer has no significant legitimate business reason[s] for [its] actions which undercut the 
section 7 rights of its employees”).  
 54. But see Contractors’ Labor Pool, 323 F.3d at 1059 (finding the rationale of Repub-
lic Aviation to be inconsistent with latter inherently-destructive-conduct cases).  
 55. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codi-
fied as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 172-187 (2000)). 
 56. See Levy, supra note 11, at 274 (“[T]he claim of one-sidedness on the part of the 
Board prompted Congress in 1947 to enact a law designed to equalize the relationship be-
tween corporations and unions, the Taft-Hartley Act.”); see also Note, The Unanswered 
Questions of American Ship, 64 MICH. L. REV. 910, 910 (1966) (observing that Congress 
placed the emphasis on equality of bargaining pressure in enacting Taft-Hartley).  
 57. Taft-Hartley also amended, or added to, many other provisions in the Wagner Act. 
For instance, Taft-Hartley added provisions increasing Board membership from three 
members to five members, making the Office of General Counsel an independent office 
separate from the Board, and increasing employers’ free speech rights in section 8(c). See 
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 41-45. 
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troducing the concept of government neutrality into labor relations58 
and by recognizing that both employers and individual employees 
needed to be protected against union excesses by being afforded cer-
tain freedoms of speech and conduct.59 
 This new orientation in governmental philosophy toward labor re-
lations found expression in various new theories espoused by the 
Justices of the Supreme Court in the years following the enactment 
of Taft-Hartley. In the context of section 8(a)(3) cases in which there 
was an absence of specific evidence of anti-union intent, the business 
justifications for employer conduct in response to concerted union ac-
tivities would slowly begin to play a larger role.60 Eventually, and as 
illustrated by the discussion of the development of the inherently-
destructive-conduct standard below, the legitimacy and substantial-
ity of the employer’s justification for its actions in these cases would 
become of paramount importance.61 
D.   Inferential Section 8(a)(3) Cases Since Taft-Hartley 
1.   Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB 
 After enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, the Supreme 
Court turned its attention to reexamine a question left open by the 
Republic Aviation decision: Under what other circumstances may a 
violation of section 8(a)(3) be found in the absence of specific evidence 
of employer anti-union intent? In 1954, the Supreme Court sought to 
clarify this issue in Radio Officers’ Union v. NLRB,62 a case in which, 
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, a company had 
agreed to grant retroactive wage increases and vacation payments to 
union members, but not to nonunion members.63  Harkening back to 
                                                                                                                    
 58. See Michael H. LeRoy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical 
Public Policy Analysis and Proposal To Balance Economic Weapons Under the NLRA, 74 
WASH. U. L.Q. 981, 983-84 (1996) (“Federal labor law envisioned that the free play of eco-
nomic forces—sometimes favoring workers, sometimes favoring employers—would deter-
mine the provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Government would merely be a 
referee in this economic struggle.”).  
 59. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 14, at 39-40. For instance, not only were 
employees granted protection in engaging in certain concerted activities, but now they 
were given equal protection in refraining from participating in such activities. See 29 
U.S.C. § 157 (as amended by the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 1947).  
 60. See infra Part II.D.  
 61. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.  
 62. 347 U.S. 17 (1954). Although the Court granted certiorari in three separate cases 
in Radio Officers’ Union, only that aspect of the case concerning Gaynor News concerns a 
discrimination issue under section 8(a)(3). The other two cases, Teamsters and Radio Offi-
cers, concerned alleged union unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 
8(b)(2) and are not discussed here. See id. at 24-33. 
 63. The employer chose not to make the retroactive payments to nonunion members 
because “it was not contractually bound to do so and, in its business judgment, did not 
choose to do so.” Id. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). Whereas previous cases had considered 
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Jones & Laughlin’s “true purpose” language, the Court stated that 
the relevance of the motivation of the employer has been consistently 
recognized in section 8(a)(3) cases64 and that it was clear that “Con-
gress intended the employer’s purpose in discriminating to be con-
trolling.”65 Nevertheless, the Court, relying in part on Republic Avia-
tion, also commented that “specific evidence of intent to encourage or 
discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 
8(a)(3),”66 and that the mere proof of certain types of discriminatory 
conduct satisfies the intent requirement.67 In other words, some em-
ployer conduct so inherently encourages or discourages union mem-
bership that specific proof of intent is unnecessary and intent is pre-
sumed.68  
 According to the Court, this was not a novel concept, but “an ap-
plication of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend the 
foreseeable consequences of his conduct.”69 When the “natural” con-
sequence of an employer’s conduct is to discourage or encourage un-
ion activity, an employer’s response that it was not its “true purpose” 
to interfere with its employees’ section 7 rights will be unavailing.70 
In Radio Officers’ Union (Gaynor News), the employer was found to 
have committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(3) be-
cause in the Court’s judgment the employer’s discriminatory action of 
                                                                                                                    
situations where discriminatory conduct had allegedly discouraged union membership, this 
case for the first time addressed the opposite situation covered by section 8(a)(3): discrimi-
natory employer conduct which allegedly encouraged union membership. Id. at 39. 
 64. Id. at 43.  
 65. Id. at 44. This statement by Justice Reed in Radio Officers’ Union has been criti-
cized as having no precedential foundation. Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1317 
(“It is apparent in retrospect . . . that when, in Radio Officers’ Union, Justice Reed posited 
a ‘purpose’ to encourage or discourage union membership as a ‘controlling’ factor in em-
ployer discrimination cases, his assertion was not justified by a careful reading of either 
the statute or existing precedent.”).  
 66. Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 44.  
 67. See id. at 45. The Court did not articulate its reasoning for the assumption that 
some acts by their very nature reflect bad intent on the part of the employer. See Meltzer, 
supra note 45, at 90. Indeed, one commentator has described this doctrine as the labor law 
version of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. See Barbara J. Fick, Inherently Discriminatory 
Conduct Revisited: Do We Know It When We See It?, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 275, 276 (1991).  
 68. Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 45. Interestingly, and as Professor White has 
observed, this “conduct-speaks-for-itself” approach has been abandoned in other discrimi-
nation contexts under other employment discrimination laws. See White, supra note 28, at 
146 (arguing that the Supreme Court, after its decision in Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), now “reject[s] an analysis that would equate the natural and 
probable consequences of employer action with an intent to achieve those consequences”).  
 69. Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 45. Christensen and Svanoe believe that the in-
troduction of inference into section 8(a)(3) cases was made necessary once the Supreme 
Court had established in Radio Officers’ Union that employer purpose to encourage or dis-
courage union membership was a controlling factor. Previous cases, such as Republic Avia-
tion, which did not appear to rest on this intent foundation, had to be accommodated by 
supplying “the missing or rebutted motive by inference.” See Christensen & Svanoe, supra 
note 28, at 1317.  
 70. Radio Officers’ Union, 347 U.S. at 45.  
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granting better benefits to union members inevitably caused the en-
couragement of union membership; that is, unlawful intent could be 
inferred based on the foreseeable consequences of such conduct on 
employees’ rights under the Act.71 
 Although the Radio Officers’ Union Court reaffirmed the general 
rule that anti-union motivation must be proven in a section 8(a)(3) 
case, it recognized an exception to this general rule on the basis of 
the foreseeable consequences that employer conduct could have on 
employee rights under the Act.72 In cases involving the exception, il-
licit motivation could be inferred from the destructive impact of such 
conduct on employee rights under the Act.73 As made apparent by 
subsequent inferential section 8(a)(3) cases, the problem introduced 
by this conduct-speaks-for-itself formulation is that it is not always 
clear what the foreseeable consequences of employer conduct are.74 
Nailing down the “natural” or “foreseeable” consequences of an em-
ployer’s action is far from a straightforward exercise; it is fraught 
                                                                                                                    
 71. Id. at 46.  The Supreme Court observed in this regard:  
[T]he desire of employees to unionize is directly proportional to the advantages 
thought to be obtained from such action. No more striking example of discrimi-
nation so foreseeably causing employee response as to obviate the need for any 
other proof of intent is apparent than the payment of different wages to union 
employees doing a job than to nonunion employees doing the same job.  
Id.   
 72. See Leonard S. Janofsky, New Concepts in Interference and Discrimination Under 
the NLRA: The Legacy of American Ship Building and Great Dane Trailers, 70 COLUM. L. 
REV. 81, 86 (1970).  
 73.  Focusing on the impact of such conduct, Professor White has compared the “con-
duct-speaks-for-itself” doctrine to an immature type of disparate impact analysis, a type of 
employment discrimination recognized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000). See White, supra note 28, at 103 (arguing for the use of 
disparate impact analysis in systemic section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases involving em-
ployer structural decisions and its use of economic weapons). Professor White correctly rec-
ognizes, however, that current Supreme Court case law considers this inferential theory of 
proof just another method of proving unlawful intent in section 8(a)(3) cases, not an alter-
native theory of discrimination under the NLRA. See id. at 102 n.16. In any event, it ap-
pears that a disparate impact model of discrimination based on notions of employee equal-
ity is incongruent with the animus model of discrimination established under the NLRA. 
See Contractors’ Labor Pool, Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.3d 1051, 1059-60 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding 
that the Board cannot base its inherently-destructive-conduct decision on disparate impact 
line of cases under Title VII).  
 74. See Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1288 (“Justice Reed did not indicate 
with any clarity what ‘types’ of discrimination supplied their own proof of motivation nor, 
among other matters, whether the intent so established was always, never, or sometimes 
rebuttable.”); Julius G. Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free 
Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735, 745 (1965) (“The Court did not explain what it 
meant by conduct which ‘inherently encourages or discourages union membership’ nor did 
it explain the basis for the assumption that such conduct inevitably reflects improper mo-
tive.”); Meltzer, supra note 45, at 90 (observing that the Court did not set forth any criteria 
for determining which conduct inherently encourages or discourages union membership).  
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with all kinds of subjective decisions about cause and effect.75 In any 
event, Radio Officers’ Union explicitly recognized the validity of in-
ferential section 8(a)(3) cases for the first time and unmistakably laid 
the analytical foundation for the inherently-destructive-conduct stan-
dard. 
2.   NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 
 Consistent with the neutral orientation of the federal govern-
ment’s labor relations policy after the enactment of Taft-Hartley, 
subsequent inferential cases under section 8(a)(3) not only focused on 
the impact of employer conduct on employee rights under the Act, 
but also considered the reasons for the employer conduct. In NLRB v. 
Erie Resistor Corp.,76 the Supreme Court explored the relationship 
between an employer’s business justifications and “conduct which 
spoke for itself” in the context of an employer’s plan to extend a 
twenty-year super-seniority credit to strike replacement workers and 
strike breakers.77 In order to lure replacement workers and encour-
age union employees to cross the picket line, the company offered a 
one-time seniority credit to ensure the permanency of the jobs of re-
placement workers and strike breakers once the strike ended and 
striking employees returned to work.78  
 Recognizing that there were two interests at stake—the right of 
the employer to run its business during the strike79 and the right of 
the employees to exercise their section 7 rights—the Erie Resistor 
Court incorporated a balancing test into the existing inferential sec-
tion 8(a)(3) calculus.80 More specifically, to determine whether the 
employer’s use of the super-seniority plan during the strike imper-
missibly discouraged employees from engaging in protected concerted 
activity, the Court found that the Board should undertake the deli-
cate task  
of weighing the interests of employees in concerted activity against 
the interest of the employer in operating his business in a particu-
lar manner and of balancing in the light of the Act and its policy 
                                                                                                                    
 75. See Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1318 (“One of [Radio Officers’ Un-
ion’s] most significant effects has been to force the Board to make largely artificial judg-
ments in many labor dispute situations.”).  
 76. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).  
 77. See id. at 222-23. Although the company attempted to meet production demand by 
utilizing non unit employees during the strike, it was not able to keep up with demand. Id. 
 78. See id. at 223. 
 79. This employer right was recognized twenty-five years earlier in Mackay Radio by 
the Supreme Court. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. 
 80. Until this time, the Board primarily engaged in a balancing of employer and em-
ployee rights in section 8(a)(1) cases. See supra note 25. Erie Resistor therefore represents 
one of the Court’s first attempts to utilize the same balancing approach with respect to sec-
tion 8(a)(3) cases. See Meltzer, supra note 45, at 115. 
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the intended consequences upon employee rights against the busi-
ness ends to be served by the employer’s conduct.81  
Because the Board concluded that the employees’ interest in engag-
ing in concerted activities was paramount,82 the Court deferred to the 
Board’s determination that the super-seniority plan “inherently dis-
criminated”83 between strikers and nonstrikers in the terms of their 
employment and had the effect of discouraging union membership, 
all in violation of section 8(a)(3).84  
 Erie Resistor therefore appears to “constitute[] . . . an attempted 
reconciliation of the hostile-motive requirement and the balancing 
test in 8(a)(3) cases. The balancing process [became] a means for es-
tablishing motive, for ‘preferring one motive to another.’”85 By requir-
ing the Board to balance conflicting, legitimate employer and em-
ployee interests before permitting the Board to infer unlawful mo-
tive, Erie Resistor suggested that there were some limits to the 
Board’s power to infer unlawful intent from the conduct of the em-
ployer.86  
3.   American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB 
 The Supreme Court next considered the inherently-destructive-
conduct standard two years later in the case of American Ship Build-
                                                                                                                    
 81. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 228-29.  
 82. The Court observed in this regard that the Board made a “detailed assessment” of 
super-seniority and the devastating consequences such plans visited on employees’ rights 
to engage in concerted strike activity. Id. at 230. Such devastating consequences included 
the fact that such plans: (1) affect the tenure of all strikers; (2) treat nonstrikers better 
than strikers; (3) induce individual strikers to abandon the strike; (4) deal a crippling blow 
to any strike effort; and (5) render future collective bargaining difficult because of the last-
ing effects of the super-seniority plan. Id. at 230-31. The Court also noted the preeminent 
position given to the right to strike under section 13 of the Act as an instrument “which in 
great measure implements and supports the principles of the collective bargaining sys-
tem.” Id. at 234. 
 83. For the first time, the Court referred to “conduct which speaks for itself” as “in-
herently discriminatory or destructive.” Id. at 228. At least one commentator has argued 
that “inherently destructive conduct is a subset of the inherently discriminatory doctrine.” 
Fick, supra note 67, at 276 n.5. Be that as it may, since the Board and most courts use the 
“inherently destructive” label for these types of cases, this Article follows their example.  
 84. Although the Board’s decisions are not immune from judicial review, if its findings 
are supported by substantial evidence, “its explication is not inadequate, irrational or arbi-
trary,” and it “[does] not exceed its powers or venture into an area barred by the statute,” 
the Court will recognize the special function of the Board in “applying the general provi-
sions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life” and defer to its judgment. Erie Resis-
tor, 373 U.S. at 236 (citations omitted).  
 85. Oberer, supra note 28, at 504 (quoting in part Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 228). But 
see White, supra note 28, at 132 (arguing that Erie Resistor makes motive essentially ir-
relevant in systemic, as compared to individual, section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases). 
 86. Other commentators have viewed the incorporation of the balancing test into sec-
tion 8(a)(3) cases as a further erosion of the intent requirement in such cases. See, e.g., 
Janofsky, supra note 72, at 86-87. 
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ing Co. v. NLRB,87 in which it examined the legality of an employer’s 
use of a bargaining lockout.88 This time a decidedly more employer-
friendly approach to the inherently-destructive-conduct standard was 
adopted by the Court than the balancing-of-interests approach devel-
oped in Erie Resistor.89 The Court stated the inherently-destructive-
conduct test as whether the employer practices “are inherently so 
prejudicial to union interests and so devoid of significant economic 
justification that no specific evidence of intent to discourage union 
membership or other antiunion animus is required.”90  
 This formulation of the inherently-destructive-conduct standard 
appeared to significantly limit the Board’s ability to infer anti-union 
intent in most section 8(a)(3) cases, as only those instances involving 
the most extreme forms of employer conduct would satisfy the 
Court’s standard and permit an inference of unlawful intent.91 Be-
cause the bargaining lockout involved in the case was supported by 
legitimate business reasons92 and did not represent an extreme form 
of employer conduct, the Court was easily able to find that unlawful 
intent could not be inferred from the employer’s conduct.93  
 At the same time, the Court chastised the Board for engaging in 
an improper balancing exercise.94 Although the Court appeared will-
                                                                                                                    
 87. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).  
 88. Bargaining lockouts, or offensive lockouts as they are sometimes called, involve 
situations where an employer locks out its employees not to avoid substantial economic 
loss (a defensive lockout), but in order to bring economic pressure to bear on the union dur-
ing collective bargaining negotiations. See Note, supra note 56, at 910-11. The employer in 
question had a long history of collective bargaining with the union, but had locked out its 
employees in order to exert economic pressure after extensive collective negotiations had 
proven fruitless. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 302-05.  
 89. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 340 (Goldberg, J., concurring). For a view that 
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the majority represented an “extreme” view of when conduct 
may be considered to carry its own indicia of unlawful intent, see Oberer, supra note 28, at 
507 n.55; see also White, supra note 28, at 133 (arguing that American Ship Building, and 
its companion case Brown, essentially rejected Erie Resistor’s balancing approach to mo-
tive).  
 90. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 311.  
 91. See id. at 340 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Oberer, supra note 28, at 507 
(“The new definition [under American Ship Building] requires, simply, that the scales be 
more out of balance than was necessary under the old balancing test, sufficiently so that 
an inference of hostile motive is more solidly based.”).  
 92. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 313. The Court also noted that the employer had 
a substantial reason for engaging in the lockout because of the highly seasonal nature of 
the employer’s business, which made it crucial for the employer to determine the timing 
and duration of any work stoppage. See id. at 305, 310. 
 93. See id. at 312.  
 94. See id. at 310 (“[T]he Act’s provisions are not indefinitely elastic, content-free 
forms to be shaped in whatever manner the Board might think best conforms to the proper 
balance of bargaining power.”); see also Meltzer, supra note 45, at 95 (citing NLRB v. In-
surance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 497 (1960), for the proposition that the Board does not have 
power to regulate economic weapons of the parties because such authority is inconsistent 
with the fundamental premise of the Act that the parties may use whatever economic 
weapons are at their disposal during collective bargaining negotiations).  
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ing to permit the Board to intervene in labor disputes where em-
ployer conduct was inherently destructive of the process of collective 
bargaining,95 it was unwilling to condone the use of the inherently-
destructive-conduct standard where the employer was merely deploy-
ing its economic weapons within a given bargaining dispute to bring 
economic pressure to bear on the union.96 Because the Court believed 
the Board had ruled in favor of the union on the basis of its belief 
that the lockout weapon gave the employer too much power, the 
Court found the Board had exceeded the scope of its authority by in-
volving itself improperly in the substantive aspects of the bargaining 
process.97  
 American Ship Building thus represents a much more conserva-
tive approach to the enterprise of inferring unlawful intent on the 
part of employers. On one hand, as long as the employer had some 
economic justification for its actions, the Board, it seemed, was pre-
cluded from inferring unlawful intent based on the impact that the 
employer’s actions had on employee rights.98 On the other hand, the 
Supreme Court severely limited the manner in which the Board 
could balance employer and employee competing interests to infer 
unlawful intent in section 8(a)(3) cases.99   
4.   NLRB v. Brown 
 To make matters even more confusing, another inferential section 
8(a)(3) case concerning an employer lockout scenario was decided by 
the Supreme Court on the very same day as American Ship Building. 
Yet this case, NLRB v. Brown,100 set forth a standard for the inher-
                                                                                                                    
 95. See Charles C. Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, The Irrelevance of the Wright Line De-
bate: Returning to the Realism of Erie Resistor in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 77 NW. U. 
L. REV. 737, 769 (1983) (“[T]he Board’s balancing process is not based on the relative eco-
nomic power of the parties, but on the relative importance of employee and employer rights 
expressly or implicitly recognized in the Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 317; see also Meltzer, supra note 45, at 95 (arguing 
that this delegation to the Board of the power to balance employer and employee interests 
is tantamount to sanctioning the impermissible regulation of bargaining weapons by the 
Board). 
 97. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 310. 
 98. The balancing approach of Erie Resistor became irrelevant under American Ship 
Building, which seemed to suggest “that the employer’s right to use the lockout as a bar-
gaining weapon [would always] outweigh[] [any] infringement on the employees’ right to 
strike.” See Note, supra note 56, at 912 n.23. 
 99. At least one commentator has argued that this distinction between the employer’s 
intent to affect the outcome of bargaining (not subject to Board balancing) and its intent to 
discourage union activities (subject to Board balancing) is patently artificial: “The desired 
consequences are manifestly interdependent; the employer’s discouragement of union ac-
tivity (adherence to union demands) is the means by which the employer seeks to improve 
his bargain.” See Meltzer, supra note 45, at 99.  
 100. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).  
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ently-destructive-conduct determination with some important differ-
ences.  
 In Brown, the Court considered whether an employer member of a 
multiemployer bargaining unit faced with a whipsaw strike101 could 
lock out its employees and temporarily hire replacement workers un-
til the strike ended.102 As in American Ship Building, there was no 
specific evidence of unlawful intent, so the Court had to consider 
whether unlawful intent could be inferred from the impact of the 
employer’s conduct on employee rights under the Act.103  
 The Brown Court set forth the applicable inherently-destructive-
conduct standard in the following manner: “[W]hen an employer 
practice is inherently destructive of employee rights and is not justi-
fied by the service of important business ends, no specific evidence of 
intent to discourage union membership is necessary to establish a 
violation of § 8(a)(3).”104 In such instances, the Court found that in-
herently destructive conduct “could not be saved from illegality by an 
asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good faith.”105 How-
ever, where “the tendency to discourage union membership is com-
paratively slight, and the employers’ conduct is reasonably adapted 
to achieve legitimate business ends,” the Court required improper 
motivation on the part of the employer to be established by inde-
pendent evidence.106 Applying these standards, the Court found the 
use of a lockout with temporary replacements in the context of a 
whipsaw strike to have only a comparatively slight tendency to dis-
courage union membership.107 In other words, the preservation of the 
                                                                                                                    
 101. A whipsaw strike is a strike in which the union attempts to undermine the cohe-
siveness of a multiemployer bargaining unit by striking individually each member of the 
unit consecutively. Because the other unstruck members of the multiemployer bargaining 
unit gain a resultant unfair advantage as a consequence of the union’s tactic, the struck 
member is forced to give in to the union’s terms in derogation of its commitment to the 
multiemployer bargaining unit. See generally NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 
(Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 89-91 (1957).  
 102. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 279-81. Previously, the Supreme Court had held that a 
lockout in response to a whipsaw strike in the multiemployer bargaining unit context was 
a lawful practice under the Act, reasoning that a balancing of interests favored the em-
ployers’ right to preserve their multiemployer bargaining unit over the union’s right to 
strike. See Buffalo Linen, 353 U.S. at 96-97. The issue in Brown was whether the addi-
tional step of using temporary replacements during the lockout to continue business con-
verted the employer conduct into unlawful conduct under section 8(a)(3). See Brown, 380 
U.S. at 280. 
 103. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 282.  
 104. Id. at 287. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 287-88. 
 107. See id. at 288. The Court pointed to three factors to support this conclusion: (1) 
“the replacements were expressly used for the duration of the labor dispute only”; (2) the 
union could end the dispute when it wanted; and (3) the union-security provision meant 
that union members had nothing to gain by quitting the union. Id. at 288-89. Specifically, 
the Court declared: “[W]e do not see how the continued operations of [the employers] and 
their use of temporary replacements imply hostile motivation any more than the lockout 
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multiemployer bargaining unit was a “legitimate business end” 
which was not unlawful under the Act because the action only had a 
comparatively slight impact on employee rights under the Act. Under 
these circumstances, the Court required specific evidence of anti-
union intent before it would characterize employer action as an un-
fair labor practice.108 Finding no such intent, the Court held that the 
employer had not committed an unfair labor practice.109  
 The Brown decision for the first time expressly divided employer 
conduct having a discriminatory effect on employee rights under the 
Act into two groups: conduct which had an inherently destructive 
impact on employee rights and conduct which had a comparatively 
slight impact on employee rights. Although the Court explained its 
comparatively-slight-impact conclusion in Brown,110 there was no at-
tempt by the Court to establish prospective rules for making this dis-
tinction in the future.111 The decision in Brown also seemed to solidify 
the importance of an employer’s business reasons for its action as 
part of the inherently-destructive-conduct test, although it was still 
unclear which party had the burden of showing that such legitimate 
business ends existed or how substantial the showing had to be for 
the employer’s reasons to be immune from attack.  
E.   Great Dane and the Inherently Destructive Standard 
 On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court decided NLRB v. Great 
Dane Trailers, Inc.,112 once and for all hoping to close the book on the 
                                                                                                                    
itself; nor do we see how they are inherently more destructive of employee rights.” Id. at 
284.  
 108. See id. at 289.  
 109. See id. at 290. The Court again chastised the Board for balancing the economic 
power of the parties in order to infer unlawful intent. See id. at 292 (“Congress has not 
given the Board untrammelled authority to catalogue which economic devices shall be 
deemed freighted with indicia of unlawful intent.”) (citing NLRB v. Ins. Agents Int’l Union, 
361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960)).  
 110. See supra note 107. But see Summers, supra note 1, at 71-72 (“[T]he Court’s for-
mulation fails even to explain Brown itself. When an employee who offers to continue 
working on his employer’s terms is temporarily replaced solely because he is represented 
by the union, why is the injury to his rights ‘comparatively slight’? . . . We know it is so 
only because the Court says it is so.”). 
 111. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 298 (White, J., dissenting). 
[I]t is difficult to fathom the logic or industrial experience which on the one 
hand dictates that a guarantee to strike replacements that they will not be laid 
off after a strike is ‘inherently destructive of employee interests,’ although 
based on a legitimate and important business justification, and yet at the same 
time dictates that the dismissal of and refusal to hire non striking union mem-
bers, who desire to work, because other union members working for a different 
employer have struck, have but a slight unimportant inhibiting effect on the af-
filiation with the union and on concerted activities.  
Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 112. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). 
70  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:51 
 
proper test to apply in inferential section 8(a)(3) cases.113 Rejecting 
outright the business-friendly inherently-destructive-conduct stan-
dard enunciated in American Ship Building, the Court in Great Dane 
embraced the “inherently destructive”/“comparatively slight” dichot-
omy set forth in Brown, but with an important twist.114 
 Great Dane involved a case in which an employer refused to pay 
striking employees vacation benefits which had accrued under the 
terms of the expired collective bargaining agreement, while simulta-
neously announcing its intention to pay these same vacation “bene-
fits to striker replacements, returning strikers, and nonstrikers who 
had been at work on a certain date during the strike.”115 Because 
there was no specific evidence that the employer’s actions against the 
strikers were motivated by anti-union intent, the Court again con-
sidered whether such intent could be inferred based on the impact 
the conduct had on employee rights under the Act.116 Synthesizing 
the holdings of previous inferential section 8(a)(3) cases, the Court 
divided all inferential cases into two categories:  
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer’s dis-
criminatory conduct was “inherently destructive” of important em-
ployee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is needed and 
the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if the employer in-
troduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business con-
siderations.117 
Second, if the adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on em-
ployee rights is “comparatively slight,” an antiunion motivation 
must be proved to sustain the charge if the employer has come 
                                                                                                                    
 113. At the time of the Great Dane decision, a clarification of the inherently-
destructive-conduct standard was necessary to alleviate the tension in the Court’s balanc-
ing approach to motive in Erie Resistor and the Court’s statements in American Ship 
Building and Brown which appeared to sharply limit the Board’s ability to balance compet-
ing interests. See White, supra note 28, at 134.  
 114. Although Great Dane is clearly more congruent with the analysis in Brown, Chief 
Justice Warren, the author of the majority opinion in Great Dane, appears to go out of his 
way to cite American Ship Building to suggest that this analysis is consistent with both 
cases. See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34. 
 115. Id. at 27.  
 116. See id. at 33. 
 117. Id. at 34. Even if conduct is found to be inherently destructive, the Supreme Court 
clarified in a later case that the Board must still “‘strike the proper balance between the 
asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights’” in order to determine 
whether the employer has committed an unfair labor practice. See Metro. Edison Co. v. 
NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 703 (1983) (quoting Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 33-34). Nevertheless, 
finding employer conduct to be inherently destructive has inevitably led to finding an un-
fair labor practice against the employer. See Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 
858 F.2d 756, 762 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“We are not aware of any case, however, in which 
either the Board or a court has found an employer’s action to be inherently destructive of 
employee rights, and then, after balancing the interests at stake, has nevertheless found 
the conduct to be lawful under the Labor Act.”). 
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forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justi-
fications for the conduct.118 
The important twist came in the seemingly innocuous concluding 
sentence of the same paragraph of the Court’s decision:  
Thus, in either situation, once it has been proved that the employer 
engaged in discriminatory conduct which could have adversely af-
fected employee rights to some extent, the burden is upon the em-
ployer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives 
since proof of motivation is most accessible to him.119 
 Because the Court concluded in Great Dane that the employer had 
not met its initial burden of proving that it had legitimate and sub-
stantial reasons for treating strikers differently than other workers 
in their eligibility for vacation benefits, “it [was] not necessary for 
[the Court] to decide the degree to which the challenged conduct 
might have affected employee rights.”120 Instead, the Court found a 
violation of section 8(a)(3) based on the fact that the necessary anti-
union intent could be inferred from employer conduct which 
“carr[ied] a potential for adverse effect upon employee rights” and 
which was not supported by any “evidence of a proper motivation . . . 
in the record.”121 
 Thus, on one hand, the Supreme Court in Great Dane appeared to 
divide the universe of employer discriminatory conduct in inferential 
section 8(a)(3) cases into either inherently destructive or compara-
tively slight conduct; there was no undistributed middle.122 On the 
other hand, placing the initial burden on the employer to prove that 
it had legitimate and substantial justifications for its conduct clearly 
made the “inherently destructive”/“comparatively slight” characteri-
zation unnecessary in some inferential cases.123 Great Dane was one 
                                                                                                                    
 118. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34. Put differently, if the conduct has a comparatively 
slight impact on employee rights and serves an employer’s substantial and legitimate 
business end, “an affirmative showing of improper motivation must be made” since under 
such circumstances the employer’s conduct is prima facie lawful. Id. 
 119. Id. (first emphasis added). Interestingly, the Court only refers to an employer 
needing “legitimate objectives” in this last sentence and not “legitimate and substantial 
business justifications,” as in the previous sentence. Nevertheless, the Board has since 
found that a “substantial” business justification means only that the employer’s reason be 
“nonfrivolous,” which appears to only require the employer to show legitimate reasons for 
its conduct. See Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597, 599 (1986).  
 120. Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 34.  
 121. Id. at 35.  
 122. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 858 F.2d at 761-62 (“‘[C]omparatively slight’ simply 
means ‘less than inherently destructive.’”). 
 123. Placing the burden of proof on the employer to prove that it was motivated by le-
gitimate and substantial business purposes regardless of the impact of its conduct was 
criticized by the dissent and has also been criticized by some commentators as a concept 
novel to Great Dane. See Great Dane, 388 U.S. at 38-39 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
Under today’s formulation, the Board is required to find independent evidence 
of the employer’s antiunion motive only when the employer has overcome the 
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such case, and its precedent, as will be demonstrated below, certainly 
offered a clear guidepost for the Board and other courts to follow in 
future inherently-destructive-conduct decisions.124   
F.   The Aftermath of Great Dane 
1.   Subsequent Supreme Court and Appellate Cases Applying the 
Inherently Destructive Standard 
 To this day, the Supreme Court has still not supplied clear pro-
spective rules for deciding when employer conduct has an inherently 
destructive impact versus a comparatively slight impact.125 In NLRB 
v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,126 the Court’s first inferential section 8(a)(3) 
case after Great Dane, the Court avoided the inherently-destructive-
conduct determination in much the same manner as the Great Dane 
Court. Having found that refusing to reinstate replaced strikers had 
“some” discriminatory effect on employee rights, the Fleetwood 
Trailer Court searched the record in vain for legitimate and substan-
tial reasons for the employer not to reinstate the former strikers.127 
Finding none, the Court was able under the Great Dane framework 
to infer anti-union intent in violation of section 8(a)(3) without need-
ing to categorize the conduct as inherently destructive or compara-
tively slight.128 Therefore, Fleetwood Trailer shed no further light on 
the logic behind the “inherently destructive”/“comparatively slight” 
dichotomy. 
                                                                                                                    
presumption of unlawful motive which the Court raises. This alteration of the 
burden in § 8(a)(3) cases may either be a rule of convenience important to the 
resolution of this case alone or may, more unfortunately, portend an important 
shift in the manner of deciding employer unfair labor practice cases under § 
8(a)(3). In either event, I believe it is unwise. 
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting); Janofsky, supra note 72, at 81 (“Strikingly enough, the Court 
had thus announced a rule not only without support in existing case law, but in fact con-
trary to established lines of decision.”).  
 124. See, e.g., Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.R.B. 78, 81 (1992) (“We 
need not decide whether, as the General Counsel contends, the Respondents’ conduct was 
inherently destructive of employee rights. Even assuming that the impact on employee 
rights of the Wednesday deadline rule for strikers was ‘comparatively slight,’ the burden 
still rests with the Respondents to establish ‘legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tions’ for the rule.”); Texaco, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 241, 247 (1987) (holding that if the em-
ployer fails to prove a nondiscriminatory business justification for withholding terminal 
benefits, it is unnecessary to pass on whether the employer’s conduct was inherently de-
structive of employee rights).  
 125. See White, supra note 28, at 136 (“The Great Dane test continues to guide section 
8(a)(3) analysis today in systemic discrimination cases. . . . The Court has not explained 
how the Board is to make that determination without engaging in the forbidden balancing 
process.”).  
 126. 389 U.S. 375 (1967). 
 127. See id. at 380. 
 128. See id.  
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 In the only other Supreme Court case to discuss an inferential 
section 8(a)(3) scenario since Fleetwood Trailer,129 Metropolitan Edi-
son Co. v. NLRB,130 the Court found an employer’s selective discipline 
of union officers to be inherently destructive of employee rights un-
der the Act and, therefore, violative of section 8(a)(3) of the Act.131 In 
doing so, however, the Court merely affirmed the Board’s conclusions 
and failed to shed any more light on how the inherently-destructive-
conduct determination should be made.132  
 Because the Supreme Court has not established clear-cut stan-
dards for determining when employer conduct reaches the inher-
ently-destructive-conduct threshold, appellate courts reviewing 
Board decisions133 have been left to fend for themselves in these types 
of cases.134 In the resulting analytical vacuum, reviewing courts have 
had to analogize to the relatively few cases where the Supreme Court 
has found conduct to be inherently destructive135 and have employed 
                                                                                                                    
 129. The Supreme Court also considered the inherently-destructive-conduct standard 
under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (2000). In Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426 (1989), the Court held 
that an employer’s conduct was not inherently destructive under the RLA where it refused 
to lay off junior crossovers in order to reinstate more senior full-term strikers at the con-
clusion of a strike. See id. at 432. Although the federal common labor law developed under 
the NLRA has been found helpful in deciding cases under the RLA, see id., at least part of 
the Court’s conclusion about whether the conduct was inherently destructive appeared to 
be based on considerations applicable only to the RLA. See id. at 442.  
 130. 460 U.S. 693 (1983). 
 131. See id. at 703. The Court’s analysis was less than clear concerning whether the 
employer had established legitimate and substantial justifications for its actions. See id. at 
703-04. Another plausible reading of Metropolitan Edison is that the Court’s decision was 
based on a finding that there was no legitimate and substantial reason for disciplining un-
ion officers disparately and, therefore, the inherently-destructive-conduct determination 
was superfluous.  
 132. See id. at 704. 
 133. Board orders are not self-enforcing; an appellate court must enforce a Board’s or-
der for it to have legal effect. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (2000). 
 134. See, e.g., Loomis Courier Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(“The phrase ‘inherently destructive’ is not easily defined and cases finding violations un-
der this standard are relatively rare.”); Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 
486 F.2d 837, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1973) (“The phrase ‘inherently destructive’ is not easily sus-
ceptible of precise definition.”); Allied Indus. Workers, Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 
878 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that it must “tread the uneasy path between ‘inherently de-
structive’ and ‘comparatively slight’ discrimination”). 
 135. See Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 762 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (“Additional illumination [of the inherently destructive standard] comes from a re-
view of the cases in which an employer’s action has been found to be on the wrong side of 
the ‘inherently destructive’ foul line.”). According to the International Brotherhood of Boil-
ermakers Court, there are Supreme Court cases that, to one degree or another, have found 
employer conduct to be inherently destructive. The International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers Court noted:  
In [Radio Officers’ Union] the Court viewed as inherently destructive “dis-
charges and suspensions of employees under company ‘no solicitation’ rules for 
soliciting union membership”; in a dictum in American Ship Building it sug-
gested that “permanently discharg[ing] unionized staff and replac[ing] them 
with employees known to be possessed of a violent antiunion animus” would 
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different standards for making the inherently-destructive-conduct 
determination.136 Under this ad hoc approach, it is hardly surprising 
that different appellate courts have come to inconsistent conclusions 
when reviewing a Board’s determination that certain employer con-
duct is inherently destructive.137 
2.   The Board’s Application of the Inherently-Destructive-Conduct         
Standard 
 Since Great Dane, the Board has also struggled in determining 
the contours of inherently destructive employer conduct.138 Neverthe-
less, the Board appears to have most frequently (though far from al-
                                                                                                                    
also fall into that category; and in Erie Resistor, the Court held that the grant 
of 20 years’ super-seniority to strike replacements and to strikers who returned 
to work was also inherently destructive of protected employee rights. 
Id. at 762-63 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Interestingly absent from this list 
is the situation in which an employer selectively disciplines union officers for failure to 
prevent union members from violating the terms of a no-strike clause. This omission may 
lend credence to the reading of Metropolitan Edison that suggests that an inherently-
destructive-conduct finding was not made in that case. See supra note 131. 
 136. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 858 F.2d at 763 (relying on a process-oriented 
approach which asks whether the employer is hostile to the process of collective bargain-
ing); Portland Willamette Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting the in-
herently-destructive-conduct cases are those “involving conduct with far reaching effects 
which would hinder future bargaining, or conduct which discriminates solely upon the ba-
sis of participation in strikes or union activity”); Inter-Collegiate Press, 486 F.2d at 845 
(noting that one commentator found “‘inherently destructive’ [to be] that which creates 
visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise of employee rights”).  One commen-
tator has noted:  
When the harm suffered by employees is the loss of a valuable employment 
benefit and the harm suffered is long-lasting in effect, the conduct is inherently 
destructive. When the impact on statutory rights is such that the right is ren-
dered nugatory (the strike collapsed) or the ability to exercise the right is se-
verely hampered (future bargaining rendered difficult or deterrence to the right 
to hold union office) then the conduct is inherently destructive. 
Fick, supra note 67, at 310-11 (footnote omitted). 
 137. Compare Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding 
that employer’s bargaining lockout with temporary replacements was inherently destruc-
tive of employee rights under the Act in violation of section 8(a)(3)), with Inter-Collegiate 
Press, 486 F.2d at 841 (“[W]e are not prepared to say absolutely that a lockout plus the hir-
ing of temporary replacements is conduct so ‘inherently destructive’ of employee rights . . . 
.”). See also Note, Labor Law—An Offensive Lockout Accompanied by Continued Operations 
with Temporary Replacement Labor is Per Se an Unfair Labor Practice in Violation of the 
National Labor Relations Act. Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971), 
50 TEX. L. REV. 552, 558 (1972) (observing that reliance on the inherently-destructive-
conduct standard has led to illogical results, including the fact that the Supreme Court has 
not found the permanent replacement of strikers to be inherently destructive, while other 
courts have found the more innocuous conduct of temporarily replacing locked-out employ-
ees to be inherently destructive).  
 138. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding the Great Dane standard has led the Board 
and the appellate courts to often disagree on what employer conduct constitutes inherently 
destructive conduct. See White, supra note 28, at 149 n.276 (citing appellate court cases 
where the appellate court and the Board have disagreed on the application of the Great 
Dane test). 
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ways) found conduct to be inherently destructive in cases in which 
the employer’s actions distinguish among workers based on partici-
pation in protected activities,139 and where employer actions discour-
age the process of collective bargaining by making it appear to be a 
futile exercise in the eyes of employees.140 On the other hand, the 
Board has generally found employer conduct to have a comparatively 
slight impact on employee rights in cases in which employers have 
locked out their employees and used temporary replacement work-
ers.141 Additionally, many Board decisions, mimicking the Great Dane 
decision itself, do not even reach the inherently-destructive-conduct 
determination. Such cases involve fact patterns where there have 
been changes in the work force during a strike and striker rein-
statement rights are at issue142 and where there has been a withhold-
ing of accrued benefits from employees during a labor dispute.143 
 Recently, the Board has attempted to formulate standards for the 
inherently-destructive-conduct determination by distilling several 
fundamental guiding principles based on past Supreme Court infer-
ential section 8(a)(3) cases.144 In International Paper Co.,145 the Board 
considered whether permanently subcontracting out bargaining unit 
work during a lockout constituted inherently destructive conduct.146 
                                                                                                                    
 139. See, e.g., Action Temp. Employment, 337 N.L.R.B. 268 (2001) (denial of reinstate-
ment to unfair labor practice strikers); Freeman Decorating Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001) 
(termination of workers based solely on worker’s union affiliation), enforcement denied sub 
nom. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
W.D.D.W. Commercial Sys. & Invs., Inc.,  335 N.L.R.B. 260 (2001) (policy of refusing to 
hire applicants whose recent wages were thirty percent higher or lower than its starting 
wages), enforcement denied in relevant part sub nom. Contractors’ Labor Pool, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 323 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 140. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1995) (engaging in permanent sub-
contract after locking out employees), enforcement denied, 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
D & S Leasing, Inc., 299 N.L.R.B. 658 (1990) (employer terminated contract and laid off 
employees to avoid bargaining obligations), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Centra, Inc., 954 
F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1992); Swift Indep. Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 423 (1988) (unlawful plan to 
close and then reopen plants for the purpose of evading application of collective bargaining 
agreement), enforcement denied sub nom. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 141. See, e.g., Marquette Co., 285 N.L.R.B. 774 (1987); Birkenwald Distrib. Co., 282 
N.L.R.B. 954 (1987); B-Bar-B, Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 250 (1986); Harter Equip., Inc., 280 
N.L.R.B. 597 (1986).  
 142. See, e.g., Pirelli Cable Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 1538 (2000); Towne Ford, Inc., 327 
N.L.R.B. 193 (1998); Circuit-Wise, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 905 (1992); Laidlaw Corp., 171 
N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969).  
 143. See, e.g., Lourdes Health Sys., Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 284 (1995), order modified, 320 
N.L.R.B. 97 (1995); Jim Walter Res., Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 1441 (1988); Youngstown Steel 
Door Co., 288 N.L.R.B. 949 (1988); Texaco, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 241 (1987). 
 144. Many, if not all of these factors, appear to derive from Professor Fick’s analysis of 
the “inherently discriminatory” doctrine. See supra note 136.  
 145. 319 N.L.R.B. 1253 (1995), enforcement denied, 115 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 146. The employer maintained that its use of a permanent subcontractor during the 
lockout was required because of its “business goal of reducing its maintenance costs both 
during the lockout and in the long term.” Id. at 1263.  
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The Board applied four “guiding principles” to make this determina-
tion: 
1. The severity of the harm suffered by employees as 
well as the severity of the impact on the statutory 
right being exercised;147  
2. The temporal nature of the conduct in question;148  
 3. Whether the employer’s conduct demonstrated hostil-
ity to the process of collective bargaining as opposed to 
a simple intention to support its bargaining position 
as to compensation and other matters;149 and 
4.  Whether employer conduct “discourage[d] collective 
bargaining in the sense of making it seem a futile ex-
ercise in the eyes of employees.”150  
 Applying these four guiding principles to the permanent subcon-
tracting scenario under review, the Board concluded that the conduct 
in question had an inherently destructive impact on employee rights 
because all four of these guiding principles were violated by the em-
ployer’s conduct.151  
 Nevertheless, International Paper fails to clarify what conduct has 
an inherently destructive impact and what conduct has a compara-
tively slight impact. The guiding principles set forth in International 
Paper appear redundant to a large extent and do little more than put 
in one place Supreme Court reasoning that had existed prior to the 
Board’s decision. Just as there was little guidance as to what conduct 
constituted inherently destructive conduct prior to International Pa-
                                                                                                                    
 147. The Board observed that an employer’s policy, like the super-seniority policy in 
Erie Resistor, which directly attaches penalties to participation in protected union activi-
ties, is inherently destructive of the employee’s statutory right to engage in those activi-
ties. Id. at 1269. 
 148. Whether employer conduct is inherently destructive hinges on the “distinction be-
tween conduct which merely influences the outcome of a particular dispute and that which 
is potentially disruptive of the opportunity for future employee organization and concerted 
activity.” Note, Lockouts—Employer’s Lockout with Temporary Replacements Is an Unfair 
Labor Practice, 85 HARV. L. REV. 680, 686 (1972). In this same vein, Professor Estreicher 
has advanced the principle of “bounded conflict,” which is based on the idea that, “while 
economic conflict is an essential, legitimate feature of our collective bargaining system, a 
strike should ordinarily not provide an occasion for terminating the bargaining relation-
ship. The strike is a means of resolving a dispute, not destroying the underlying bargain-
ing structure.” See Samuel Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 288 
(1987).  
 149. See Int’l Paper, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1269 (citing Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 
300, 309 (1965)). 
 150. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  
 151. See Int’l Paper, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1270. The Board made clear, however, that con-
duct need not exhibit all four characteristics in order to be considered inherently destruc-
tive. Id. at 1275. 
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per, those questions appear no more resolved merely because the 
Board combined all the various Supreme Court rationales.152  
 Moreover, the Board’s International Paper decision appears to 
make the all-too-common mistake of characterizing employer conduct 
as inherently destructive, even though there was no finding that the 
employer had a legitimate and substantial justification for its con-
duct.153 Great Dane, however, makes abundantly clear that once some 
discriminatory effect on employee rights has been found and no le-
gitimate and substantial justification for the employer’s conduct can 
be located in the record, unlawful intent can be inferred to support a 
section 8(a)(3) violation without the conduct having to be further la-
beled inherently destructive or comparatively slight.154  
3.   Remaining Issues Surrounding the Inherently-Destructive-
Conduct Standard 
 Having examined in extensive detail the doctrinal framework sur-
rounding the inherently-destructive-conduct standard in inferential 
section 8(a)(3) cases, the primary problem with its current iteration 
under Great Dane seems clear. The inherently-destructive-conduct 
standard would appear, even under International Paper’s guiding 
principles, to give unguided discretion to Board Members to deter-
mine whether discriminatory intent should be inferred from em-
ployer conduct.155 It is anyone’s guess what conduct is, and what con-
                                                                                                                    
 152. As if to underline the unsatisfactory resolution of the inherently-destructive-
standard conundrum by the Board in International Paper, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals looked at the same conduct as the Board in International Paper and came 
to the opposite conclusion—certainly an inauspicious start for a supposedly fresh approach 
to this intractable issue. See Int’l Paper Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 1045, 1049-51 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (finding that implementation of a permanent subcontract during a lockout was not 
inherently destructive of employee rights because such action was similar to hiring perma-
nent replacements, did not create unit divisiveness, and did not convey the futility of bar-
gaining). 
 153. See Int’l Paper, 319 N.L.R.B at 1273 (“The [employer] introduced no evidence, 
however, that such a cost reduction—even assuming that it represented a significant re-
duction of costs below those incurred under the temporary subcontract with BEK—was es-
sential to continuing its operations during the lockout.”). On the other hand, given some of 
the Board’s other language, it may have found the conduct in question supported by le-
gitimate and substantial reasons, but  it nevertheless found that the inherently destructive 
character of the conduct outweighed such justifications. Id. at 1266 (holding that the em-
ployer “conduct is unlawful under section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act be-
cause it is inherently destructive of employees’ section 7 rights and because the [em-
ployer]’s asserted business justification for its conduct does not outweigh the harm to those 
important employee rights”).  
 154. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.  
 155. See Fick, supra note 67, at 276 (“While the Supreme Court has developed this doc-
trine, it has not precisely defined its contours, leaving the Board, the Courts of Appeal, and 
even the Supreme Court itself to struggle with the applicability of the doctrine to specific 
employer conduct on a case-by-case basis.”); Susan J. Cole, Note, Discriminatory Discipline 
of Union Representatives for Breach of Their “Higher Duty” in Illegal Strikes, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 900, 914 (1982) (“The Great Dane test is difficult and confusing to apply, and the lower 
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duct is not, “inherently destructive”; you might as well ask a Great 
Dane.  
 One commentator has even suggested that Board Members in 
these cases are often left to defend their decisions with no more than 
an unpersuasive “I know it when I see it” rejoinder.156 Indeed, with-
out knowing anything more about these cases, there is every reason 
to assume that Republican Board Members will be less likely to infer 
unlawful intent on the part of employers, while Democratic Board 
Members may be more likely to do so—the end consequence being 
“[j]udgment which bends with the political winds.”157 In short, these 
inherently-destructive-conduct cases appear to present ample oppor-
tunity for Board Members to base the “inherently destruc-
tive”/“comparatively slight” distinction on their personal political 
preferences, rather than on the merits of the case.158  
 Whether the Board is really applying the inherently-destructive-
conduct standard in a blatantly political manner can only be dis-
cerned through empirical study of the Board’s inherently-destructive-
conduct cases. Such a study will help clarify exactly how this highly 
indeterminate standard has been applied in practice by the Board. 
Empirical findings that indicate the Board is implementing this 
standard in a consistent, nonpartisan basis will no doubt bolster the 
Board’s credibility by reassuring both management and labor that 
industrial justice may still be obtained at the NLRB.159 
III.   THE INHERENTLY-DESTRUCTIVE-CONDUCT EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 A number of commentators have discussed and analyzed the theo-
ries behind the inherently-destructive-conduct analysis conducted 
                                                                                                                    
courts have been left to determine for themselves the meaning of the phrases ‘inherently 
destructive’ and ‘comparatively slight’ and to create a standard of weights for the balancing 
test.” (footnote omitted)). 
 156. See Fick, supra note 67, at 276-77 (“One is often left with the feeling that at-
tempts to define inherently discriminatory conduct, like attempts to define obscenity, may 
never be completely successful, but that experienced labor lawyers know it when they see 
it.”) (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring)).  
 157. See Summers, supra note 1, at 86.  
 158. This wiggle room provided to Board Members is potentially significant as charac-
terization of the impact that the employer conduct has on employee rights is generally tan-
tamount to deciding whether the conduct is lawful or unlawful. See Janofsky, supra note 
72, at 97-98 (“The applicable category can . . . be crucial, since in a slight harm case where 
there is business justification, the General Counsel must prove by independent evidence 
the existence of anti-union motivation. On the other hand, in a severe harm case, justifica-
tion may be of no avail.”); White, supra note 28, at 136 (“The classification of conduct as 
inherently destructive or comparatively slight . . . frequently determines the outcome.”). 
 159. See Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor Board: Continuing a Tradition of Mod-
eration and Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 126 (2000) (noting the importance of both labor 
and management representatives being equally convinced of the independence and judi-
ciousness of the Board). 
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under section 8(a)(3).160 Theory alone, however, cannot shed light on 
how the inherently-destructive-conduct standard is being applied by 
the National Labor Relations Board. It is necessary to get one’s 
hands analytically dirty by actually examining Board cases in which 
the inherently-destructive-conduct standard has been applied under 
the Great Dane framework.161  
 This Article therefore provides the first empirical investigation of 
inherently-destructive-conduct case trends from June 1967 (when the 
seminal Great Dane case was decided) to the present (February 
2004). It examines whether there is in fact a correlation between a 
Board’s political composition and whether employer conduct is found 
to have an inherently destructive impact on employee rights under 
the Act. The results of this analysis will not only shed light on how 
the Board attempts to decide these difficult cases, but will also add 
an important contribution to the debate over whether the Board, and 
other administrative agency adjudicators in general, has the capacity 
to engage in collegial decisionmaking in the midst of highly charged 
political environments.  
A.   Method by Which the Board’s Inherently-Destructive-Conduct 
Decisions Were Selected for the Empirical Analysis 
 In order to analyze the Board’s application of the inherently-
destructive-conduct standard in section 8(a)(3) cases under the 
NLRA, a query was run in Westlaw’s “FLB-NLRBDEC” database,162 
seeking all Board cases that mentioned in any way the terms “Great 
Dane,” “inherently destructive,” or “comparatively slight.”163 This 
                                                                                                                    
 160. See generally Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28; Fick, supra note 67; Janofsky, 
supra note 72; Meltzer, supra note 45; White, supra note 28.  
 161. See supra note 9; see also infra notes 185-94 and accompanying text (discussing 
the methodology utilized for this analysis).  
 162. “FLB-NLRBDEC” is short for “Federal Labor & Employment—National Labor Re-
lations Board—Board Decisions.” Westlaw describes this database in the following man-
ner:  
The FLB-NLRBDEC database contains documents released by the National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). A document is an adjudicative decision reached 
by the NLRB, and may be the formal conclusion of an adversarial hearing that 
reviews exceptions filed to an Administrative Law Judge’s decision, an order, 
an advisory opinion, or other materials released by the NLRB. Many docu-
ments include the earlier findings and recommendations of an Administrative 
Law Judge; however, uncontested ALJ decisions are not included in this data-
base. 
 This database includes documents released for publication in Decisions and 
Orders of the National Labor Relations Board . . . and slip copy decisions as 
they are released by the NLRB prior to publication in the official reports.  
See Contents  of  Westlaw’s  FLB-NLRBDEC  database, at  http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/ 
default.wl?RS=WLW4.06&VR=2.0&FN=_top&SV=Split&MT=Westlaw&RP=%2fscope%fde 
fault.wl&DB=FLB-NLRBDEC (last visited Sept. 21, 2004). 
 163. Adding the terms “inherently discriminatory” and “inherent discrimination” ex-
panded the list of results to 927 cases, but did not add any additional relevant Great Dane-
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query returned 835 Board cases having one of these phrases in the 
text of the document.164 The list of relevant cases was then reduced to 
825 cases, as the last ten case results were decided prior to the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Great Dane.  
 Thereafter, the list of inherently-destructive-conduct cases was 
reduced to 140 cases by placing primary emphasis on decisions in 
which the Board actually applied the Great Dane framework to the 
facts of the case.165 For instance, if the court mentioned Great Dane 
or employed inherently-destructive-conduct language, but neverthe-
less concluded that there was not some discriminatory effect on em-
ployee rights caused by the employer’s conduct, the case was ex-
cluded from empirical study on the grounds that the Board’s decision 
did not properly fall under the Great Dane framework.166 Similarly, if 
a case involved specific evidence of anti-union intent or utilized a 
Wright Line analysis, the case was disqualified from the study.167 
Furthermore, cases that utilized inherently-destructive-conduct lan-
guage in a conclusory manner without attempting to apply the Great 
Dane analysis,168 or which appeared to implicate Great Dane issues 
                                                                                                                    
type cases to the empirical list. Adding the term, “Erie Resistor,” expanded the list further 
to 1064 case results, but again did not lead to the discovery of additionally relevant Great 
Dane-type cases. 
 164. This query was last run on February 11, 2004.  
 165. A list of these cases, and their relevant case characteristics, is attached to this Ar-
ticle as Appendix A. 
 166. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967) (Great Dane analy-
sis only applies to cases in which the “employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which 
could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent.”). A number of cases were 
therefore excluded from the list because even though inherently destructive conduct may 
have been discussed, there was no discriminatory effect on employee rights. See, e.g., NYP 
Acquisition Corp., 332 N.L.R.B. 1041 (2000), enforced sub nom. Newspaper Guild, Local 
No. 3 v. NLRB, 261 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 2001); Nuclear Fuel Serv., Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 309 
(1988); Aztec Bus Lines, Inc., 289 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1988); Sherwin-Williams Co., 269 
N.L.R.B. 678 (1984); Knuth Bros., Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. 1204 (1977), enforced, 584 F.2d 813 
(7th Cir. 1978); Jubilee Mfg. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 272 (1973), enforced, 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
 167. The crucial difference between Wright Line-type cases and Great Dane cases is 
that the former requires specific evidence of anti-union intent, whether through direct or 
indirect (pretextual) evidence, while the latter allows such anti-union intent to be inferred 
from the impact of employer conduct on employees’ section 7 rights. See supra notes 31-33 
and accompanying text. Thus, if a case in the database used inherently-destructive-
conduct language, but concluded that there was specific evidence of anti-union intent, the 
Board decision was excluded from the empirical study. See, e.g., Raytheon Missile Sys. 
Div., 279 N.L.R.B. 245 (1986); Medallion Kitchens, Inc., 275 N.L.R.B. 58 (1985), enforced, 
806 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1986); Kelly-Goodwin Hardwood Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 33 (1984), en-
forced, 762 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1985); Spencer Foods, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1483 (1984), af-
firmed in part and reversed in part sub nom. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Un-
ion, Local 152 v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 259 
N.L.R.B. 961 (1982), enforcement denied, 722 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983); Bridgford Distrib. 
Co., 229 N.L.R.B. 678 (1977); Elec. Fittings Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1975); Barwise Sheet 
Metal Co., 199 N.L.R.B. 372 (1972).  
 168. Although some might argue that inherently-destructive-conduct cases decided in a 
conclusory manner are pregnant with decisionmaker bias rather than reason and, there-
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but failed to use the language of Great Dane or apply its framework, 
were also removed from the empirical list.169 
 Another group of cases were rendered ineligible for the analysis 
stemming from the fact that Board decisions, both in the official 
Board reporter and on Westlaw, include both the Board’s decision as 
well as the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) under 
the Board’s review.170 Because the emphasis of this empirical study is 
on how the Board applies the inherently-destructive-conduct doc-
trine, not how ALJs apply this standard, documents containing a 
Great Dane analysis performed only by the ALJ were excluded. Con-
sequently, cases where the Board merely affirmed the ALJ’s conclu-
sions without comment,171 decisions where the Board relied upon an 
                                                                                                                    
fore, should be included in the empirical study, because the decisionmakers have not ex-
plained their thought process through the Great Dane framework, it is not possible to 
speculate on what basis the Board decided these cases. As a result, it is necessary to ex-
clude these conclusory cases from the analysis. See, e.g., Walton & Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 780 
(2001); Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 308 N.L.R.B. 841 (1992); Conoco, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 
819 (1982), enforced, 740 F.2d 811 (10th Cir. 1984); Milwaukee Spring Div., 265 N.L.R.B. 
206 (1982), remanded, 718 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1983); Lutheran Home, 264 N.L.R.B. 525 
(1982); A.P.A. Transp. Corp., 239 N.L.R.B. 1407 (1979); Bridgford Distrib. Co., 229 
N.L.R.B. 678 (1977); Abex Corp., 215 N.L.R.B. 665 (1974), enforcement denied, 543 F.2d 
719 (9th Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, if a conclusory decision had a reasoned dissent, that dis-
sent was included for limited purposes. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.  
 169. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, 278 N.L.R.B. 378 (1986); Gulton Electro-
Voice, Inc., 266 N.L.R.B. 406 (1983), enforced sub nom. Local 900, Int’l Union of Elec. 
Workers, v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Miller Brewing Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 266 
(1981), enforced sub nom. Szewczuga v. NLRB, 686 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Vesuvius 
Crucible Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 1279 (1980), enforcement denied, 668 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1981); 
Fort Pitt Steel Casting Div., 244 N.L.R.B. 970 (1979), enforcement denied, 649 F.2d 859 (3d 
Cir. 1981); W. Steel Casting Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 870 (1977); Dairylea Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 656 
(1975), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees, Local 338, 531 F.2d 
1162 (2d Cir. 1976).  
 170. See Flynn, Hiding The Ball, supra note 8, at 414.  
 171. This category is by far the largest category of excluded cases because it is common 
practice for the Board to affirm an ALJ’s decision without comment. See WILLIAM B. 
GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB—A MEMOIR 69 (2000) 
(“All too frequently, the Board’s decision simply affirms the rather lengthy opinion of an 
administrative law judge and does not provide the parties or the public with guidance on 
how they should conduct themselves in comparable circumstances so as to avoid litiga-
tion.”). And although such summary affirmances are precedential (to the extent that any 
Board decision is precedential) and one could conceivably argue that these cases imply that 
the Board has adopted the ALJ Great Dane analysis in toto, because it is not possible to 
speculate about the reasoning behind the Board’s affirmances without a proper Great Dane 
analysis being performed by the Board, these cases could not be properly categorized and 
had to be excluded from the analysis. Accord James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility 
Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1696 n.78 (1999) (excluding court decisions that were summary affir-
mances from empirical analysis). For examples of such excluded cases, see Catalytic Indus. 
Maint. Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 342 (1991), enforced, 964 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1992); Waterbury 
Hosp., 300 N.L.R.B. 992 (1990), enforced, 950 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1991); Sun Oil Co., 245 
N.L.R.B. 59 (1979); L.A. Marine Hardware Co., 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978), enforced, 602 F.2d 
1302 (9th Cir. 1979); Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 535 (1977); Sargent-Welch 
Scientific Co., 208 N.L.R.B. 811 (1974); Texaco Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 989 (1969).  
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alternative theory to the ALJ’s Great Dane theory,172 and cases where 
the ALJ was chastised for relying on a Great Dane analysis without 
it being alleged or litigated173 were disqualified from the empirical 
list. Furthermore, because the focus of this empirical study is only on 
the employer discrimination provisions of section 8(a)(3), cases that 
applied the Great Dane analysis and the inherently-destructive-
conduct terminology to other unfair labor practice provisions, includ-
ing sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2), were also ex-
cluded.174 
 Last, a more difficult determination had to be made as to whether 
or not to include Board cases that only had the Great Dane analysis 
in a concurring or dissenting Board Member’s opinion.175 In the end, 
this dilemma was resolved by including such cases in statistics con-
cerning the number of individual inherently-destructive-conduct de-
cisions made, or not made, by Board Members, but excluding these 
decisions from statistics involving the overall number of Board or 
panel inherently-destructive-conduct decisions.  
                                                                                                                    
 172. See, e.g., Interstate Builders, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 835 (2001); Laidlaw Waste Sys., 
Inc., 313 N.L.R.B. 680 (1994); Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 970 (1991), enforced, 976 
F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1992); Jumbo Produce, Inc., 294 N.L.R.B. 998 (1989), enforced, 931 
F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1991); Empire Pac. Indus., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1981); Ethyl Corp., 
231 N.L.R.B. 431 (1977); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1975), enforce-
ment denied, 558 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1977).  
 173. See, e.g., Ken Maddox Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 340 N.L.R.B. 1 (2003); 
Barry-Wehmiller Co., 271 N.L.R.B. 471 (1984); Lee Norse Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 801 (1980).  
 174. Because Great Dane was specifically decided in the section 8(a)(3) context, in 
which establishing intent is key to the outcome of the case, it is unlikely that application of 
the doctrine to most other unfair labor practices is proper. But see Int’l Bhd. of Boilermak-
ers, Local 88 v. NLRB, 858 F.2d 756, 761 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding, unconvincingly, that 
the Supreme Court determined in Fleetwood Trailer that the Great Dane analysis applied 
to section 8(a)(1) cases). For examples of cases where the analysis was applied to different 
unfair labor practice provisions, see Mainline Contracting Corp., 334 N.L.R.B. 922 (2001) 
(section 8(a)(1) interference case); H.B. Zachry Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 967 (1995) (section 8(a)(1) 
interference case), enforcement granted in part sub nom. Int’l Bhd. of Boilermakers v. 
NLRB, 127 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1997); Daily News of Los Angeles, 315 N.L.R.B. 1236 
(1994) (section 8(a)(5) duty-to-bargain case), enforced, 73 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Martiki 
Coal Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 476 (1994) (section 8(a)(1) interference case); Alaska Pulp Corp., 
300 N.L.R.B. 232 (1990) (section 8(a)(1) interference case), enforced, 944 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 
1991); Oil Workers Int’l Union, Local 5-114, 295 N.L.R.B. 742 (1989) (section 8(b)(1)(A) un-
ion interference case), supplemented, 304 N.L.R.B. 167 (1991); C. F. Martin & Co., 252 
N.L.R.B. 1192 (1980) (section 8(a)(5) duty-to-bargain case); Thorwin Mfg. Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 
620 (1979) (section 8(a)(1) interference case); Int’l Org. of Masters, 219 N.L.R.B. 26 (1975) 
(section 8(b)(1)(a) union interference case). Although inferring intent is also at issue in a 
section 8(b)(2) case in which the union is charged with causing an employer to discriminate 
against an employee, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2000), because the focus of this study is on 
unlawful employer conduct, not unlawful union conduct, the few section 8(b)(2) cases in-
volving an inherently-destructive-conduct analysis have also been excluded. See, e.g., 
Phila. Typographical Union No. 2, 189 N.L.R.B. 829 (1971).  
 175. See, e.g., TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 612 (1999) (Member Hurtgen, dissenting), 
vacated by 296 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003); G. C. Murphy 
Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 579, 579 (1973) (Member Fanning, dissenting). 
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 Others, of course, may disagree with both the Board decisions ex-
cluded from, and included in, this empirical analysis. Given that the 
Board’s decisions in these inherently-destructive-conduct cases are 
analytically inconsistent and that many difficult determinations had 
to be made concerning which decisions to include in the study,176 it is 
unlikely that any empirical list would satisfy all.177 Nonetheless, the 
remaining cases on the list have at least the following important 
common denominator: they all involve the Board grappling with how 
to apply the Great Dane framework in practice.  
B.   Criteria by Which the Board’s Inherently-Destructive-Conduct 
Decisions Were Analyzed 
 Having settled upon 140 Board cases to include in the empirical 
analysis of the inherently-destructive-conduct standard, there re-
mained two key issues to consider. First, what type of analysis 
should be employed to adequately capture the Board’s approach to 
inherently destructive conduct in these cases? Second, how should 
these Board decisions be categorized? 
 On the first issue, this Article utilizes a decidedly qualitative 
analysis.178 Although the trend in recent legal scholarship has been to 
apply social science-based statistical techniques,179 such as logistic 
regressions,180 this Article focuses on the doctrinal legal reasoning 
                                                                                                                    
 176. See White, supra note 28, at 138 (“The Court’s Great Dane test is an analytical 
mess.”). 
 177. Indeed, some might argue that any such empirical list is hopelessly flawed be-
cause of the large number of unfair labor practice cases, including inherently-destructive-
conduct cases, that do not even reach the Board for resolution. See Brudney et al., supra 
note 171, at 1698. However, because this study seeks to examine the manner in which the 
Board decides cases which actually reach it and not to track the success or failure of all po-
tential inherently-destructive-conduct cases, this limitation should not fundamentally af-
fect the legitimacy of this study’s findings. See id. 
 178. “Qualitative analysis,” as used in this Article, refers to a study that places pri-
mary emphasis on doctrinal legal reasoning as a means for explaining a particular case 
outcome, as opposed to emphasizing a decisionmaker’s social background as an explana-
tory device for his or her decisions. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 330; see also Edwards, 
Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1653 (“Qualitative variables [include] what the law 
requires, the parties’ arguments, the actual content of judges’ deliberations, and the nu-
ances of opinions . . . .”). In particular, Judge Edwards has argued that collegiality is a type 
of qualitative variable. See id. at 1656.   
 179. There are two primary models that social scientists employ to explain how judges 
decide cases: the attitudinal model (which claims “that judges decide cases on the basis of 
their personal policy preferences and political ideologies”) and the strategic model (which 
views judges as responsive to their colleagues and “focuses on panel composition and pre-
sumed interactions among judges”). See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 
1652. Both of these models excessively rely on quantitative data to assess the dynamics of 
decisionmaking. See id. at 1653. 
 180. See, e.g., Brudney et al., supra note 171, at 1682; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991); Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and 
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that informs the outcomes of the Board’s inherently-destructive-
conduct cases.181 Rather than focusing on either the gross number of 
cases deemed “inherently destructive” versus “comparatively 
slight”182 or the personal characteristics of the Board Members decid-
ing these cases (with the notable exception of the Board Member’s 
political affiliation),183 this Article emphasizes how each of these 
cases were decided by placing the Board’s inherently-destructive-
conduct decisions into four different analytical scenarios. 
 Consequently, not only is each of the 140 inherently-destructive-
conduct Board cases scrutinized on the basis of such characteristics 
as the date of decision, the presence or absence of concurrences or 
dissents, procedural history, and political composition of the Board 
panel hearing the case,184 but more importantly, this Article estab-
lishes an analytical framework for deciphering the different deci-
sional approaches Board Members take in inherently-destructive-
conduct cases. Specifically, the Great Dane framework permits cases 
to be decided in accordance with one of four possible analytical sce-
narios.  
 First, if the employer conduct causes some discriminatory effect 
on employee rights under the Act, and if the employer cannot meet 
its burden of proving a legitimate and substantial business reason for 
its actions against the union, impermissible motive is implied (“Sce-
                                                                                                                    
Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging 
Job Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992).  
 181. Thus, this empirical analysis focuses on how Board Members qualitatively decide 
cases by relying on precedents, rules, reasoning, and argument. See Edwards, Effects of 
Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1653.  
 182. As the Fourth Circuit has stated in the slightly different context of analyzing an 
ALJ’s decision, a decisionmaker should not be “rate[d] . . . by the percentage of times he or 
she rules on a given side of a case. To evaluate [his or her] impartiality in this way 
amounts to judging his [or her] record by mere result or reputation. In reality, such statis-
tics tell us little or nothing.” See Fieldcrest Cannon, Inc. v. NLRB, 97 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 
1996); accord Eldeco, Inc. v. NLRB, 132 F.3d 1007, 1010 (4th Cir. 1997). Significantly, such 
statistics “do not tell us whether the ALJ decided individual cases correctly.” See Fieldcrest 
Cannon, 97 F.3d at 69; see also Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholar-
ship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 177 (2002). 
 183. This Article does not attempt to predict Board Member decisional behavior by in-
quiring into the Member’s personal characteristics such as socioeconomic background, edu-
cation, or sex. See Schneider, supra note 9, at 325 (discussing a lawyer’s approach to ana-
lyzing judicial decisionmaking versus a social scientist’s approach). For examples of arti-
cles employing the social background model, see Brudney et al., supra note 171, at 1679; 
William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-Making Revisited, 48 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 237, 254-55 (1995).  “An obvious criticism of attempting to link judges’ 
social backgrounds and their decisions is that it undervalues ‘legal doctrine, in particular 
[by] failing to appreciate how judges develop that doctrine primarily through reasoned 
elaboration of language and precedent in written decisions, not through subconscious infil-
tration of life experiences.’” Schneider, supra note 9, at 331 (alteration in original) (quot-
ing, in part, Brudney et al., supra note 171, at 1682); see also Revesz, supra note 182, at 
177 (“The possible constraining effects of law are taken far more seriously in law schools 
than in social science departments.”).  
 184. See infra Appendix A.  
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nario 1”).185 In Scenario 1 cases, there is no need to determine 
whether the impact on employee rights is inherently destructive or 
comparatively slight if the employer does not meet its initial burden 
of proof.186  
 If the employer can come forward with legitimate and substantial 
business justifications for its actions, the Board must then decide if 
the impact of the conduct is inherently destructive or comparatively 
slight.187 If the conduct is found to be inherently destructive, even 
though the Board must still conduct a balancing of employer and 
employee interests,188 it is inevitable that an illicit employer motive 
will be implied and the conduct held to be illegal as a result of the 
severe impact the employer conduct has on employee rights (“Sce-
nario 2”).189 On the other hand, if the conduct is deemed to have a 
comparatively slight impact on employee rights, the same balance 
will inexorably come out in favor of the employer since the balancing 
                                                                                                                    
 185. Unlawful motive is implied in such circumstances because in weighing the com-
peting employer and employee interests, there is “nothing of significance in the way of jus-
tification [which] appears on the employer’s side of the scales.” See Oberer, supra note 28, 
at 508. Scenario 1 cases are still different from Wright Line pretext cases, however, be-
cause in Scenario 1 cases there is still no specific evidence of anti-union evidence, whether 
proven directly or indirectly (pretextually). Instead, unlawful motive is implied from the 
conduct itself in the absence of the employer alleging a legitimate and substantial reason 
for its conduct. Pretext, on the other hand, is based on a disbelief of the employer’s alleged 
business reasons. 
 186. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 35 (1967) (“Since discrimina-
tory conduct carrying a potential for adverse effect upon employee rights was proved and 
no evidence of a proper motivation appeared in the record, the Board’s conclusions [finding 
a section 8(a)(3) violation] were supported by substantial evidence.”). But see Laidlaw 
Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 (1968) (“As Respondent brought forward no evidence of 
business justification for refusing to reinstate these experienced employees while continu-
ing to advertise for and hire new unskilled employees, we find such conduct was inherently 
destructive of employee rights.”), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969). As argued below, 
equating a lack of business justification with inherently destructive conduct, as in Laid-
law, is clearly contrary to the teachings of Great Dane. See Janofsky, supra note 72, at 94; 
see also infra note 214 and accompanying text.  
 187. There is some confusion as to whether the employer conduct should itself be cate-
gorized as inherently destructive or comparatively slight, or whether the employer’s inter-
est in engaging in the conduct should be weighed against employees’ rights under the Act 
as an initial matter in order to determine the proper categorization. See Janofsky, supra 
note 72, at 99.  
 188. See supra note 117. 
 189. See Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 928, 930 n.13 (1998). 
In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), the Court revised the 
first Great Dane test by requiring the Board, even in circumstances where em-
ployer conduct is found to be inherently destructive, to weigh any asserted 
business justifications against the invasion of employee rights in order to de-
termine whether an unfair labor practice has been committed. This burden has 
been described as “heavy . . . if not impossible,” International Paper Co. v. 
NLRB, 115 F.3d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and there is no Board or court 
case in which employer conduct analyzed under this revised standard has been 
found to be lawful. 
Id.; see also Jackson & Heller, supra note 95, at 774; Oberer, supra note 28, at 508; White, 
supra note 28, at 136-37.  
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of interests will only include a slight impact on employee rights un-
der the Act and at least a legitimate interest on the side of the em-
ployer (“Scenario 3”).190  
 Last, even if the employer has established a substantial and le-
gitimate business interest and the impact of the conduct is compara-
tively slight, the union can still prevail on its unfair labor practice 
claim if it can prove a violation by coming forward with specific evi-
dence of unlawful motive (“Scenario 4”).191 This last category appears 
to be a legal empty set.192 Section 8(a)(3) cases appear to be analyzed 
under Great Dane only when there is an absence of specific evidence 
of anti-union intent.193 It therefore makes no sense to say the union 
may still prevail once a comparatively-slight-impact determination 
has been made by the Board if there is specific evidence of anti-union 
intent when there is never specific evidence of intent in inferential 
cases. In other words, Scenario 4 cases only exist outside the inferen-
tial world of Great Dane.194  
 As illustrated below, categorizing inherently-destructive-conduct 
cases using this analytical framework brings much needed clarity to 
examining how the Board manages to achieve decisional consistency 
in this area of labor law even in the face of a highly indeterminate—
almost meaningless—standard.  
                                                                                                                    
 190. See Christensen & Svanoe, supra note 28, at 1328.  
If legitimate and substantial interests are set forth in the record [and the im-
pact is deemed comparatively slight], the determination made will plainly be a 
balancing of respective interests—statutory versus economic. In such instances, 
the injury to statutory interests being admittedly slight, the balance presuma-
bly will always be struck on the side of the economic interests. 
Id.; see also Cole, supra note 155, at 914. 
 191. Specific evidence of employer anti-union purpose is required in Scenario 4 cases 
because a finding that the conduct in question is comparatively slight “undermines the in-
ference of hostile motive” on the part of the employer. See Fick, supra note 67, at 334.  
 192. Indeed, the empirical analysis conducted below establishes that none of the 
Board’s 140 inherently-destructive-conduct cases include a Scenario 4 case. See infra note 
207 and accompanying text. 
 193. See supra note 167.  
 194. Perhaps the Scenario 4 cases are nothing more than specific evidence of anti-
union intent cases. Yet it is not at all clear that the Great Dane framework even applies to 
all section 8(a)(3) cases. See Janofsky, supra note 72, at 96.  
Another question in this area arises with respect to the common Section 8(a)(3) 
case where an employer discharges an employee allegedly for “cause” and is 
met with a complaint charging that the discharge was for union activity. How, 
if at all, do the rules of Great Dane apply in such a case? There is no express 
statement in the Great Dane decision exempting such cases from the rules es-
tablished therein. 
Id. But see White, supra note 28, at 136 (suggesting that the Great Dane analysis only ap-
plies to systemic cases under section 8(a)(3)).  
2004]                          POLITICS NOT AS USUAL  
 
87
IV.   FINDINGS OF THE INHERENTLY-DESTRUCTIVE-CONDUCT  
 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS195 
 Although, as determined by the analysis conducted above, there 
are 140 Board cases196 in which the Board applied the Great Dane 
framework to determine whether anti-union intent could be inferred 
from employer responses to union concerted activity, there are in re-
ality 144 inherently-destructive-conduct decisions since four of the 
cases analyzed had two separate inherently-destructive-conduct find-
ings.197 As Great Dane was decided over thirty-six years ago, the 
overall number of decisions indicates that the Board on average198 
made four inherently-destructive-conduct decisions a year.199  
 Thirty-four different NLRB Members, including fifteen Democ-
ratic Members and nineteen Republican Members, applied the Great 
Dane framework.200 On an individual Board Member basis, there 
                                                                                                                    
 195. Appendix B contains case statistics from the inherently-destructive-conduct em-
pirical analysis. 
 196. The Term “Board cases,” refers to decisions of either a panel of the Board (three 
Members participating) or the full Board (four or five Members of the Board generally), de-
pending on whether a panel or the full Board heard a given case. Generally, only the more 
important decisions are heard by the full Board. See Cooke et al., supra note 183, at 240. 
The full Board currently (as of May 31, 2004) consists of three Republicans (Chairman Bat-
tista and Members Schaumber and Meisburg) and two Democrats (Members Liebman and 
Walsh). National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Board Members, at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/structure/fbmembers.asp (last visited Sept. 22, 2004). 
 197. See infra Appendix A; Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 928 (1998) (both Sce-
nario 1 and 3 decisions); Texaco, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 508 (1988) (both Scenario 1 and 3 deci-
sions); Salinas Valley Ford Sales, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 679 (1986) (both Scenario 1 and 3 de-
cisions); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 223 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1976) (both Scenario 2 and 3 de-
cisions), enforcement denied, 557 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 198. Some years had as many as fifteen inherently-destructive-conduct decisions 
(1987), while some years had none (2002). See infra Appendix A.  
 199. Given that there have been nearly 12,000 section 8(a)(3) charges filed against em-
ployers in a given year and the Board decides approximately 300 section 8(a)(3) cases per 
year, this empirical data makes clear that inferential section 8(a)(3) cases are indeed very 
rare, even if the previously excluded categories of cases, such as summary affirmances of 
ALJ decisions, are taken into account. See Michael J. Hayes, Has Wright Line Gone 
Wrong? Why Pretext Can Be Sufficient To Prove Discrimination Under The National Labor 
Relations Act, 65 MO. L. REV. 883, 886 n.6 (2000) (noting that inherently-destructive-
conduct cases are considered “unusual” in comparison to cases which require a showing of 
anti-union purpose on the part of the employer); see also Cooke et al., supra note 183, at 
238-39 (stating that the Board decided only about 2.5% of all ULP cases closed in fiscal 
year 1990); Charles J. Morris, Deterring 8(a)(3) Discharges with 10(J) Injunctions: Profes-
sor Morris’ Comments on the Katz et al. Commentary, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT 
POLICY J. 75, 83 (2000) (“It can thus be reported that during FY98 a total of 311 ALJ deci-
sions involving all cases containing Section 8(a)(3) issues were decided after evidentiary 
hearings.”).   
 200. Member Zimmerman, who served from 1980 to 1984, is listed on the Board’s web-
site as an Independent. National Labor Relations Board, National Labor Relations Board 
Members,  http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/about/structure/fbmembers.asp (last visited June 12, 
2004). Traditionally, the Board at any given time has three Members from the President’s 
political party and two Members from the other party. David A. Morand, Questioning the 
Preemption Doctrine:  Opportunities for State-Level Labor Law Initiatives, 5 WIDENER J. 
PUB. L. 35, 79-80 (1995). Member Zimmerman, during his tenure, filled one of the Democ-
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were 467 inherently-destructive-conduct decisions, including 243 
(52%) Republican Board Member decisions and 224 (48%) Democratic 
Board Member decisions.201 On a decisional basis, Republican-
majority panels of the Board decided seventy-nine (55%) inherently-
destructive-conduct decisions, while Democratic-majority panels de-
cided sixty-two (43%) of these decisions.202 The remaining three (2%) 
inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were decided by nonmajor-
ity panels of the Board.203  
 These statistics make clear that each political party contributed 
almost equally to the decisions made in these inherently-destructive-
conduct cases; that is, Board Members of one political party were no 
less likely to apply the inherently-destructive-conduct analysis de-
veloped under Great Dane than members of the opposing political 
party.204 Nevertheless, inherently-destructive-conduct cases proved to 
be somewhat contentious among Board Members205 and also between 
the Board and reviewing appellate courts in general.206  
                                                                                                                    
ratic seats and, therefore, is treated as a Democrat for purposes of this analysis. Board 
Members deciding inherently-destructive-conduct cases (with the number of inherently-
destructive-conduct individual decisions in parentheses) include Democratic Members 
Liebman (12), Walsh (5), Truesdale (18), Fox (4), Gould (10), Browning (4), Devaney (12), 
Cracraft (16), Babson (27), Dennis (8), Zimmerman (11), Fanning (50), Penello (32), Brown 
(10), and McCulloch (5), and Republican Members Battista (2), Schaumber (1), Hurtgen 
(9), Brame (1), Higgins (2), Cohen (3), Stephens (40), Raudabaugh (8), Oviatt (6), Johansen 
(42), Dotson (26), Hunter (7), Jenkins (48), Van de Water (2), Murphy (14), Walther (3), 
Kennedy (11), Miller (14), and Zagoria (4). See infra Appendix A. 
 201. See infra Appendix B.  By “Republican Board Member decisions,” and “Democratic 
Board Member decisions,” I am not referring to the composition of the panel or the compo-
sition of the Board at the time of the decision, but individual decisions made by Board 
Members in a given case. 
 202. Infra Appendix B.  
 203. Nonmajority decisions occur when Board vacancies are to be filled.  
 204. Interestingly, however, there were many more inherently-destructive-conduct de-
cisions by the Board in past decades than in more recent decades. Of the 144 decisions, 
sixty-two (or 43%) were decided in the 1980s and forty-two (or 29%) were decided in the 
1970s. In comparison, only twenty-five inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were made 
in the 1990s, and only nine decisions have been made in the first four years of this decade. 
See infra Appendix B. This, of course, could be related to the declining number of unions 
and union members in recent years.  
 205. Overall, there were fifty-one cases (36% of all cases) that either contained a dis-
sent or a concurrence. Out of the 140 inherently-destructive-conduct cases, there were 
thirty-nine cases with dissents, representing 28% of cases. Republicans were responsible 
for twenty-eight dissents, while Democrats authored sixteen dissents. See infra Appendix 
B. 
 206. Fifty-eight cases (41%) were appealed. Fifty-three percent of Democratic-majority 
inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were appealed, while 30% of Republican-majority 
inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were appealed. See infra Appendix B.  Of these 
appeals, thirty-five Board decisions (60%) were enforced or review was denied, while 
twenty-three Board decisions (40%) were denied enforcement or vacated. See infra Appen-
dix B. Sixty-four percent of Democratic-majority Board decisions appeals were enforced, 
while 54% of Republican-majority Board decisions were enforced. See infra Appendix B.  Of 
the cases examined, some Board cases were only enforced in part. In those circumstances, 
the case was analyzed in detail to determine whether the Board’s order was enforced on 
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 In order to place in perspective the manner in which Board Mem-
bers from both parties analyzed inherently-destructive-conduct deci-
sions, as discussed in Part III of this Article, each decision was 
placed into one of four potential analytical case scenarios. Of the 144 
inherently-destructive-conduct decisions analyzed, there were sixty-
nine (48%) Scenario 1 decisions, twenty-seven (19%) Scenario 2 deci-
sions, fourty-eight (33%) Scenario 3 decisions, and zero Scenario 4 
decisions.207 The specific findings relating to each type of case sce-
nario are discussed in turn below.208  
A.   Scenario 1 Case Statistics 
 Almost 50% of the inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were 
Scenario 1 cases, resolved in a fashion similar to the Great Dane case 
itself; that is, because there were no legitimate and substantial busi-
ness reasons, there was no need for an inherently-destructive-
conduct determination.209 Republican and Democratic Boards were 
surprisingly similar in their willingness to engage in Scenario 1-type 
analyses.210 For instance, 43% of Republican-majority Board deci-
sions could be described as Scenario 1, while the same could be said 
of 56% of Democratic-majority Board decisions. Similarly, on an indi-
vidual Board Member basis, Scenario 1 decisions represented 109 
(49%) of all individual decisions made by Democratic Board Mem-
bers, while their Republican counterparts made 100 (41%) Scenario 1 
decisions. 
 Interestingly, a sizable majority of Scenario 1 decisions involved 
comparable types of cases.211 Specifically, there were two types of 
Scenario 1 inherently-destructive-conduct cases that occurred re-
                                                                                                                    
the inherently-destructive-conduct issue. If so, it was counted as an enforcement for statis-
tical purposes. 
 207. On an individual Board Member basis, out of 467 individual decisions, 209 (or 
45%) were Scenario 1, 88 (or 19%) were Scenario 2, 165 (or 35%) were Scenario 3, and zero 
were Scenario 4. See infra Appendix B. 
 208. Because there were no Scenario 4 cases, a separate statistical analysis of Scenario 
4 cases was unnecessary. 
 209. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34-35 (1967). 
 210. Because this Article starts with the assumption that Republican Board Members 
will vote in favor of employers and Democratic Board Members will do the opposite in in-
herently-destructive-conduct cases as a consequence of highly indeterminate standards be-
ing at play, the relative closeness of these percentages suggests another factor is leading to 
this unexpected amount of decisional consistency. See infra Part V.D. 
 211. This is not to say that the fact patterns in these cases were identical or even sub-
stantially similar and, therefore, required the Board to follow a clear line of precedent; to 
the contrary, the factual scenarios in these cases represent a wide array of different types 
of employer conduct. By saying there were “comparable types of cases,” I only mean to 
identify the recurring nature of certain groups of cases (that is, those involving striker re-
instatement rights, those involving striker benefit rights, and so on). Moreover, and impor-
tantly, the Board does not appear to strictly follow principles of stare decisis. See infra note 
268 and accompanying text.  
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peatedly: those concerning the reinstatement of economic strikers af-
ter a vacancy and an unconditional offer to return to work (Laidlaw 
cases)212 and those concerning the denial of accrued benefits to strik-
ing workers (Texaco cases).213 In each type of case, a violation of sec-
tion 8(a)(3) could be found if the employer did not establish legiti-
mate and substantial business reasons for taking the actions in ques-
tion. In either situation, once such justifications were found lacking, 
there was no need to continue the analysis to characterize the degree 
of impact such conduct had on employee rights as inherently destruc-
tive or comparatively slight.214  
                                                                                                                    
 212. See Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 
1969). Laidlaw is a prototypical Scenario 1 case because in Laidlaw,  
the Court pointed out that by virtue of Section 2(3) of the Act, an individual 
whose work ceases due to a labor dispute remains an employee if he has not ob-
tained other regular or substantially equivalent employment, and that an em-
ployer refusing to reinstate strikers must show that the action was due to le-
gitimate and substantial business justification. 
Id. at 1368. Although there are some recognized legitimate and substantial reasons that 
meet the Laidlaw standard, see infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text, generally most 
employers who fail to reinstate such strikers are found to be in violation of section 8(a)(3) 
without proof of anti-union intent. Indeed, in thirty-six out of forty-one Laidlaw cases, or 
88% of these cases, an employer was found to have violated section 8(a)(3) by failing to re-
instate permanently replaced economic strikers. In all, thirty-six out of seventy-one Sce-
nario 1 cases, constituting 51% of Scenario 1 cases, were Laidlaw reinstatement cases. See 
infra Appendix B. 
 213. See Texaco, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 241 (1987). Under Texaco, “the General Counsel 
bears the prima facie burden of proving at least some adverse effect of the benefit denial on 
employee rights. The General Counsel can meet this burden by showing that (1) the benefit 
was accrued and (2) the benefit was withheld on the apparent basis of a strike.” Id. at 245. 
“Once the General Counsel makes a prima facie showing of at least some adverse effect on 
employee rights the burden under Great Dane then shifts to the employer to come forward 
with proof of a legitimate and substantial business justification for its cessation of bene-
fits.” Id. at 246. Again, although there are some well-recognized legitimate and substantial 
reasons for denial of accrued benefits, see infra note 257 and accompanying text, if such 
reasons are not established by the employer, a violation of section 8(a)(3) is made out with-
out an inherently-destructive-conduct determination being made. Id. at 247 (“In the ab-
sence of [legitimate and substantial business justifications], and in accord with Great 
Dane, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the [employer]’s conduct was ‘inherently 
destructive’ of employee rights.”). In twenty-two out of thirty-nine Texaco cases, or 56% of 
such cases, no legitimate and substantial justification was found and there was a section 
8(a)(3) violation. In all, twenty-two out of seventy-one Scenario 1 cases, constituting 31% of 
Scenario 1 cases, were Texaco denial-of-benefit cases. See infra Appendix B. 
 214. Part of the reason that the Board may be coming to these unnecessary conclusions 
in Laidlaw cases is that in Laidlaw itself the Board improperly read Great Dane and 
Fleetwood Trailers as equating a finding of no legitimate and substantial business reasons 
with a finding of inherently destructive conduct. See Laidlaw, 171 N.L.R.B. at 1369 (“As 
[the employer] brought forward no evidence of business justification for refusing to rein-
state these experienced employees while continuing to advertise for and hire new unskilled 
employees, we find such conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights.”). On the 
other hand, the Board’s decision in Texaco properly concluded that when the employer is 
unable to establish a legitimate and substantial business reason for its actions, it is unnec-
essary for the degree of impact of the decision on employee rights to be determined. See 
Texaco, 285 N.L.R.B. at 247 (1987).  
We conclude therefore, that the [employer] has failed to prove a legitimate and 
substantial business justification for its suspension of A&S benefits and of 
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 Remarkably, Laidlaw and Texaco cases made up 82% of all Sce-
nario 1 cases (fifty-eight out of seventy-one decisions).215 Equally 
noteworthy is the fact that there were more Republican-majority 
Board decisions coming to Scenario 1 outcomes in these cases (thirty-
two decisions) than Democratic-majority Board decisions (twenty-six 
decisions). Republican Scenario 1 Laidlaw and Texaco decisions rep-
resented 41% of all Republican-majority Board inherently-
destructive-conduct decisions, while Democratic Laidlaw and Texaco 
Scenario 1 decisions represented 42% of all Democratic-majority 
Board decisions.  
B.   Scenario 2 Case Statistics 
 Roughly one out of five of the inherently-destructive-conduct deci-
sions involved a Scenario 2 circumstance in which the Board deter-
mined that the conduct engaged in by the employer was inherently 
destructive of employee rights under the Act and, therefore, violative 
of section 8(a)(3). Democratic Boards were almost three times more 
likely than Republican Boards (29% versus 11%) to find employer 
conduct inherently destructive. On an individual basis, 25% of De-
mocrat Board Member decisions fell within Scenario 2, while only 
13% of Republican Board Member decisions were Scenario 2.  
 This apparent disparity between Republican and Democratic 
Board decisions in Scenario 2-type cases is misleading, however, be-
cause both Republican and Democratic Board Members repeatedly 
misapplied the analytical model established by Great Dane for inher-
ently-destructive-conduct cases.216 Properly applied, Scenario 2 deci-
sions should have only involved determinations where there was 
both a finding that the employer had legitimate and substantial 
business justifications for its conduct and that such conduct had an 
                                                                                                                    
Turner’s pension credit. In the absence of such proof, and in accord with Great 
Dane, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the [employer]’s conduct was 
‘inherently destructive’ of employee rights. 
Id. 
 215. See infra Appendix B. There were two cases in which there were both Scenario 1 
Laidlaw and Texaco findings. See Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 79 (2003); Nat’l 
Football League Mgmt. Council, 309 N.L.R.B. 78 (1992). For purposes of analysis, these 
decisions were counted once in both the Laidlaw and Texaco ledgers. Consequently, there 
was a total of seventy-one Scenario 1 decisions when the cases were categorized in this 
manner.  
 216. An argument can be made that decisionmakers who are acting in a biased manner 
would be likely to purposely misapply the Great Dane analysis to promote their outcome-
driven agenda. Although there is certainly a possibility that this is what is motivating cer-
tain Board Members to decide these cases in this manner, the fact that so many of these 
cases were decided inconsistently with Great Dane suggests less biased decisionmaking 
and more unfamiliarity with the teachings of Great Dane. Moreover, if Democratic Board 
Members were truly interested in misapplying the analysis in order to support unions, one 
would think there would be more than just 25% of Democratic-majority decisions making 
inherently-destructive-conduct determinations.  
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inherently destructive impact on employee rights under the Act.217 
Indeed only two such Scenario 2 cases were observed in this empiri-
cal study.218  
 Other putative Scenario 2 cases demonstrate that the Board made 
the inherently-destructive-conduct determination improperly or un-
necessarily in at least four different ways: (1) by making the inher-
ently-destructive-conduct characterization first and then circling 
back to conclude that the employer also had no legitimate and sub-
stantial reasons for its conduct;219 (2) by making the inherently-
destructive-conduct determination after the Board concluded that the 
employer did not have legitimate and substantial reasons for its ac-
tions;220 (3) by making the inherently-destructive-conduct determina-
tion in a conclusory manner without even considering the employer’s 
reasons for its conduct;221 and (4) by making the inherently-
                                                                                                                    
 217. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text. 
 218. Both were Democratic-majority Board decisions. See W.D.D.W. Commercial Sys. 
& Invs., Inc., 335 N.L.R.B. 260 (2001) (finding hiring policy based on 30% rule supported 
by legitimate and substantial business justifications, but also finding it had an inherently 
destructive impact on employee rights under the Act), enforcement denied in relevant part 
sub nom. Contractors’ Labor Pool, Inc. v. NLRB, 323 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Swift 
Serv. Stores, Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. 359 (1968) (finding clause in bonus plan disqualifying 
striking employees had an inherently destructive impact even if it were assumed that the 
employer conduct was supported by legitimate and substantial business reasons). Al-
though two cases represent too small a statistical sample to derive many meaningful con-
clusions, one important conclusion that can be made is that neither Republican nor De-
mocratic Board Members are using the Great Dane framework to invalidate employer re-
sponses to union concerted activity by characterizing them as inherently destructive. See 
infra Part V.A. 
 219. See, e.g., Freeman Decorating Co., 336 N.L.R.B. 1 (2001), enforcement denied sub 
nom. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2003); 
Honeywell, Inc., 318 N.L.R.B. 637 (1995); Sierra Realty Corp., 317 N.L.R.B. 832 (1995), en-
forcement denied, 82 F.3d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Swift Indep. Corp., 289 N.L.R.B. 423 
(1988), enforcement denied sub nom. Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Interstate Paper Supply Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1423 (1980); Borden, Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 982 
(1978), enforced in relevant part, 600 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1979), and enforced after remand, 
645 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1981); Portland Willamette Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 272 (1974), enforcement 
denied, 534 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1976); Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 
123 (1973), enforced, 502 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir. 1974); Austin & Wolfe Refrigeration, Air Con-
ditioning & Heating, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 135 (1973).  
 220. See, e.g., Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 393 (1976), supplemented by 226 
N.L.R.B. 688 (1976), enforced in relevant part, 574 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1978); Cutten Su-
permarket, 220 N.L.R.B. 507 (1975). On the other hand, if the Board merely equated a lack 
of legitimate and substantial justifications with being inherently destructive without doing 
two separate analyses, these cases were labeled as Scenario 1. See, e.g., Electro Vector, 
Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 445 (1975) (finding that because employer conduct was not supported by 
legitimate and substantial business justifications that conduct was therefore inherently 
destructive), enforcement denied, 539 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1976); Ross Sand Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 
915 (1975). 
 221. See, e.g., Handi-Bag Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 221 (1983); Consolidation Coal Co., 263 
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1982); Burlington Homes, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1029 (1979); Wallace Metal 
Prods., Inc., 244 N.L.R.B. 41 (1979); Brown Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 769 (1979); Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 237 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1978), enforced as modified, 603 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1978); 
2004]                          POLITICS NOT AS USUAL  
 
93
destructive-conduct determination even though the Board had al-
ready found specific evidence of anti-union intent.222 If one subtracts 
these analytically inappropriate findings from the Scenario 2 ledger 
and either relabels these cases as Scenario 1 cases or eliminates 
them from the empirical analysis altogether as non-Great Dane 
cases, this leaves only two (1%) decisions left which properly fit 
within the Scenario 2 category. 
C.   Scenario 3 Case Statistics 
 Scenario 3 cases, in which the employer has been found to have a 
legitimate and substantial reason for its actions and where such ac-
tions have been found to have a comparatively slight impact on em-
ployee rights, represent approximately one out of every three inher-
ently-destructive-conduct decisions. In this regard, Republican-
majority Boards were three times more likely than Democratic-
majority Boards (46% of Republican-majority Board decisions versus 
15% of Democratic-majority Board decisions) to find employer con-
duct to have a comparatively slight impact on employee rights under 
the Act.223  
 Nevertheless, and consistent with findings made in conjunction 
with Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 cases, most of the differences between 
Republican and Democratic Board Members concerning Scenario 3 
cases do not appear to hinge on the characterization of employer con-
duct as comparatively slight versus inherently destructive. Instead, 
in almost all of these cases, Board Members appear to be disagreeing 
over whether an employer had a legitimate and substantial business 
                                                                                                                    
Crawford Container, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 851 (1978); Pittsburgh Press Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 408 
(1978); Fla. Steel Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 923 (1977).  
 222. A finding of both specific anti-union intent on the part of the employer and a find-
ing of inherently destructive conduct on the part of the employer in the same case have 
been found to be superfluous by at least one Board Member. See D & S Leasing, Inc., 299 
N.L.R.B. 658, 661 n.13 (1990), enforced sub nom. N.L.R.B. v. Centra, Inc., 954 F.2d 366 
(6th Cir. 1994). 
Because, as explained below, the record supports a finding of actual antiunion 
motive in the termination of the D & S employees and their subsequent treat-
ment by Central (refusing to rehire some of them and hiring others as “new” 
employees), Chairman Stephens finds it unnecessary to make an ‘inherently 
destructive’ finding pursuant to the analysis set out in Great Dane. 
Id.  Nevertheless, the Board made both findings in a number of cases. See, e.g., Freeman 
Decorating, 336 N.L.R.B. 1; Honeywell, 318 N.L.R.B. 637; Interstate Paper, 251 N.L.R.B. 
1423; Wallace Metal, 244 N.L.R.B. 41; Crawford Container, 234 N.L.R.B. 851. At worst, the 
Board completely confused the analysis in these cases; at best, the Board made gratuitous 
findings as a hedge against being overturned by a reviewing appellate court.  
 223. On an individual Board Member basis, Republican Board Members made 107 
Scenario 3 decisions, constituting 44% of all individual decisions made by Republican 
Board Members, while Democratic Board Members made fifty-eight Scenario 3 decisions, 
constituting 26% of all individual decisions made by Democratic Board Members. See infra 
Appendix B. 
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justification for its conduct.224 If no such justification was found, the 
conduct fell under Scenario 1 without the Board making an inher-
ently-destructive-conduct determination. On the other hand, if such 
justifications were found, although it was conceivable that the con-
duct could still be found inherently destructive, in fact only two deci-
sions in thirty-six years resulted in such a Scenario 2 outcome.225 In 
other words, in almost all cases where the Board found that an em-
ployer’s conduct was supported by a legitimate and substantial busi-
ness justification, regardless of whether a Republican-majority panel 
or Democratic-majority panel was involved, it inexorably followed 
that the impact of such conduct was considered comparatively slight 
and thus, such cases are classified as Scenario 3 cases.226 
 Overall, 81% of inherently-destructive-conduct decisions were ei-
ther Scenario 1 or Scenario 3 decisions in which the Board focused on 
an employer’s legitimate and substantial business justifications.227 If 
one recategorizes the Scenario 2 cases which should have been cate-
gorized as Scenario 1 cases or as specific evidence cases (all but two 
decisions), 99% of inherently-destructive-conduct cases were decided 
on the basis of whether an employer had legitimate and substantial 
justifications for its response to union concerted activity.228  
 Additionally, like Scenario 1 decisions, most Scenario 3 decisions 
can fit into specific types of recurring cases.229 Unlike Scenario 1 
cases, however, there are three, not two, types of specific Scenario 3 
cases. In addition to Laidlaw and Texaco cases, there is also a recur-
ring pattern of cases involving an employer lockout of its employees 
with the use of temporary replacement workers (Harter cases).230 
Harter, Laidlaw, and Texaco Scenario 3 cases combined to make up 
73% of all Scenario 3 cases, with Republican-majority Boards being 
responsible for 89% of these decisions.231 Thirty-nine percent of Re-
                                                                                                                    
 224. Although a partisan split over the legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tion component of the Great Dane analysis is, on its face, just as disturbing as a partisan 
split on the inherently-destructive-conduct question, the Board has developed presump-
tions to determine how the legitimate and substantial business justification should be ana-
lyzed, and these presumptions substantially constrain Board Member discretion. See infra 
Part V.C. 
 225. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra note 190.  
 227. See infra Appendix B.  
 228. See infra Appendix B.  
 229. See supra note 211. 
 230. See Harter Equip., Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 597 (1986). Harter involved a Board deter-
mination that employers have a legitimate and substantial reason in most cases for using 
temporary replacements in lockout situations and that the use of temporary replacements 
has no more than a comparatively slight impact on the section 7 rights of locked-out em-
ployees. See id. at 600. Consequently, specific evidence of anti-union intent is required in 
these cases in order for a section 8(a)(3) violation to be found. Id. 
 231. See infra Appendix B.  Although it is conceded that this statistic would appear to 
support the political nature of this determination, in reality Democratic and Republican 
Board Members are really just differing over whether the employer has a legitimate and 
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publican-majority Board decisions were Harter, Laidlaw, or Texaco 
Scenario 3 decisions, while 6% of Democratic-majority decisions were 
Harter, Laidlaw, or Texaco Scenario 3 decisions.232 
 Combining all Laidlaw, Texaco, and Harter cases under Scenario 
1 and Scenario 3, these cases make up almost two out of three (65%) 
of every inherently-destructive-conduct decision the Board has de-
cided since Great Dane.233 Sixty-two percent of these decisions are 
Scenario 1 cases (ULP finding) and 38% of these decisions are Sce-
nario 3 cases (no ULP finding).234 Eighty percent of all Republican-
majority Board inherently-destructive-conduct decisions are Harter, 
Laidlaw, or Texaco cases, while 48% of Democratic-majority Board 
inherently-destructive-conduct decisions are Harter, Laidlaw, or Tex-
aco decisions.235  
V.   CONCLUSIONS BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF THE INHERENTLY-
DESTRUCTIVE-CONDUCT EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 Based on the findings from the empirical analysis of the Board’s 
inherently-destructive-conduct cases under section 8(a)(3) described 
above, four important conclusions come to the fore. 
 First, there is little correlation between the political composition 
of the Board, or a panel of the Board, and the frequency of inher-
ently-destructive-conduct determinations. Second, this lack of corre-
lation between political party and frequency of inherently-
destructive-conduct determinations derives from the Board’s strategy 
of calculated avoidance, in which it perhaps purposefully chooses to 
focus its attention on the more easily discernible inquiry concerning 
the presence or absence of legitimate and substantial business justi-
fications for employer conduct.236 Third, although the Board is doing 
nothing less than engaging in a discretionary section 8(a)(1) balanc-
ing exercise in these inherently-destructive-conduct cases, the Board 
in fact is able to achieve a considerable amount of decisional consis-
tency across party lines through the use of presumptions, which con-
strain discretion, for specific types of inherently-destructive-conduct 
cases. Finally, the findings of this empirical study suggest that Board 
                                                                                                                    
substantial business justification for its response to union concerted activity. And although 
this determination could be a similarly political determination as much as the “inherently 
destructive”/“comparative slight” determination, the evidence suggests that Board Mem-
bers have utilized the same presumptions to constrain their discretion and have come to 
similar outcomes in these cases across party lines. See infra Part V.C.  
 232. See infra Appendix B.  
 233. See Infra Appendix B. 
 234. See Infra Appendix B.  
 235. See Infra Appendix B.  
 236. The basis for the argument that the legitimate-and-substantial-business-
justification inquiry is an easier one than the inherently-destructive-conduct determina-
tion is discussed in detail infra Part V.C. 
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decisions may not be as politically motivated as historically thought; 
rather, the effects of collegiality, a factor previously neglected, may 
play a significant role in explaining these counterintuitive results.  
A. Conclusion #1: Political Composition of the Board Is Not 
Predictive of Whether the Board Will Find Conduct  
 Inherently Destructive   
 Initially, the suspicion that served as the impetus for this Article 
was that an inherently meaningless standard could not be consis-
tently applied by a partisan Board constantly struggling to grasp its 
meaning. It was assumed, based on the findings of previous studies, 
that Democratic Board Members would support union claims of dis-
crimination by inferring intent from employer conduct whenever pos-
sible, while Republican Board Members would do just the opposite in 
seeking to protect employers from unfair labor practice charges.237 
 The results of this Article’s empirical analysis have turned previ-
ous understandings concerning the dynamics of Board Member deci-
sionmaking on their head. With regard to inherently-destructive-
conduct determinations (as opposed to whether there exists an unfair 
labor practice at all),238 there is a surprising amount of decisional 
consistency in how Board Members from different parties resolve 
these cases. In short, regardless of party, and even under the most 
liberal analysis of what constitutes a Scenario 2 case, inherently-
destructive-conduct determinations are sparse. Republican-majority 
Boards made seventy-nine inherently-destructive-conduct decisions, 
of which only nine (11%) involved characterization of conduct as in-
herently destructive.239  
 Although that result cannot be considered unusual given Republi-
can Board Members’ natural sympathies for employer interests, De-
mocratic-majority Boards made only slightly more inherently-
destructive-conduct determinations. Even under the most liberal 
view of what constitutes a Scenario 2 case, out of sixty-two inher-
ently-destructive-conduct Democratic Board decisions, only eighteen 
(29%) represented Scenario 2 outcomes.240 Even though Republican 
Boards exhibited a slightly less pronounced propensity to label em-
ployer conduct inherently destructive (11%), the relative closeness in 
                                                                                                                    
 237. See supra note 7.  
 238. A finding that Republican and Democratic Boards are both unlikely to label con-
duct as inherently destructive does not answer the question as to whether there is consis-
tency across party lines in finding unfair labor practices in these cases. As explained 
above, an unfair labor practice may still be found in a Scenario 1 case where there is some 
discriminatory effect on employee rights and an employer has no legitimate and substan-
tial justification for its conduct. Whether decisional consistency extends to case outcomes is 
discussed infra Parts V.D and VI.  
 239. See infra Appendix B.  
 240. See infra Appendix B.  
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outcome between Democratic and Republican Board decisions in 
these cases is quite remarkable given previous notions of the Board’s 
inherent political bias. 
 Furthermore, if one takes a more strict view as to what properly 
can be characterized as a Scenario 2 case, the lack of political bias in 
making these determinations becomes even starker. As explained in 
Part IV, there are only two decisions that are truly Scenario 2 deci-
sions; that is, decisions in which the employer has been found to have 
legitimate and substantial reasons for its conduct and where the im-
pact of such conduct is considered inherently destructive of employee 
rights.241 All other Scenario 2 inherently-destructive-conduct findings 
represent an amalgam of inappropriate, unnecessary, or inconsistent 
findings.242  
 Thus, neither Republican nor Democratic Boards were likely to 
find conduct to be inherently destructive once they determined an 
employer had legitimate and substantial business justifications for 
its actions. Only 3% of Democratic Board inherently-destructive-
conduct decisions come out this way and there are no such Republi-
can Board decisions. In short, regardless of party, Board Members 
are avoiding, perhaps purposefully, making the inherently-
destructive-conduct characterization in these inferential section 
8(a)(3) cases. There is clearly something else at work that is keeping 
Board Members of both political parties from making these charac-
terizations, even though they appear to be free to make such politi-
cally motivated decisions if they so desire. 
B.   Conclusion #2: The Legitimate and Substantial Business 
Justification Test Is at the Heart of the Inherently-Destructive-
Conduct Determination 
 The Board has appeared to achieve consistency across party lines 
in not labeling most employer conduct inherently destructive.  This 
was achieved by engaging in a strategy of calculated avoidance, 
which permits the Board to evade the inherently destruc-
tive/comparatively slight determination altogether. The Board ac-
complishes this tactic by taking advantage of the doctrinal innova-
tion introduced by the Great Dane case.  
 As discussed above, as long as there is some discriminatory effect 
on employee rights caused by the employer conduct, the burden is on 
the employer to prove that it had legitimate and substantial reasons 
for engaging in that conduct, because such proof of motivation is 
most accessible to the employer.243 If the employer cannot meet this 
                                                                                                                    
 241. See supra note 218. 
 242. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.  
 243. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
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burden, there is simply no need to go further and characterize the 
degree of impact such conduct has on employee rights, as a section 
8(a)(3) violation may be found without more based on inferred anti-
union intent.244 Moreover, and as illustrated in Part IV.C in conjunc-
tion with the discussion on Scenario 3 case statistics, a finding that 
the employer does have legitimate and substantial justifications is 
normally tantamount to a finding that the conduct only has a com-
paratively slight impact, and that no unfair labor practice has been 
committed under section 8(a)(3).245 Consequently, the sufficiency of 
the business reason for an employer’s conduct drives the determina-
tion of whether there is an unfair labor practice in these cases.246 In-
deed, even under the most relaxed view of what constitutes a Sce-
nario 2 case, 81% of inherently-destructive-conduct cases analyzed 
were Scenario 1 or Scenario 3 cases where the result of the case 
turned on the business justifications offered for the employer con-
duct.247  
 Yet, even though a determination based on the balancing of em-
ployer and employee interests would seem to permit as much deci-
sional discretion as the inherently-destructive-conduct determination 
itself, there is still a surprising amount of decisional consistency in 
these cases from the standpoint of whether Republican versus De-
mocratic boards found that an employer committed an unfair labor 
practice under section 8(a)(3). Combining Scenario 1 and 2 cases 
(cases in which section 8(a)(3) violations were found), Republican 
Board majorities found unfair labor practices in 54% of their inher-
ently-destructive-conduct cases.248 On the other hand, Democratic-
majority Board cases making Scenario 1 or 2 findings (and therefore 
finding unfair labor practices) accounted for 85% of their inherently-
destructive-conduct cases.249  
                                                                                                                    
 244. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.  
 245. See supra notes 224-26 and accompanying text. 
 246. In essence, by focusing on the legitimate and substantial justifications for em-
ployer conduct, the Board appears to be engaged in a sub rosa weighing of employer inter-
ests against employee interests. This is exactly the approach taken in section 8(a)(1) cases 
where the focus of the Board is not on the intent of the employer but on whether the em-
ployer’s conduct impermissibly interferes with the section 7 rights of employees. See supra 
note 25 and accompanying text. What is less clear is whether this is the type of impermis-
sible balancing of bargaining power for which the Board has been chastised by the Su-
preme Court or the permissible balancing of employer economic interests against employee 
statutory interests. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text; see also White, supra 
note 28, at 139 (explaining that the resultant lack of guidance from the Supreme Court 
“not only breeds uncertainty but invites in through the back door the balancing the Court 
consistently has refused to embrace under section 8(a)(3)”). 
 247. See infra Appendix B.  If one imposes analytical consistency on the Board’s inher-
ently-destructive-conduct decisions, 99% of inherently-destructive-conduct cases turn on 
the business justification determination. See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.  
 248.  See infra Appendix B.  
 249.  See infra Appendix B.  
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 Although Democratic Boards were more likely to find unfair labor 
practices in these cases, the fact that Republican Boards found unfair 
labor practices in a majority of these inherently-destructive-conduct 
cases is more remarkable and significant. One would have expected 
Republican Board Members to use the flexibility imparted by this le-
gal standard to find in favor of employers whenever possible if previ-
ous understandings of politically motivated Board decisionmaking 
were accurate.250 Instead, the fact that Republican Boards still found 
unfair labor practices in a majority of these cases suggests that 
Board Member discretion is constrained by something else, whatever 
it is, which permits a large degree of decisional consistency even 
when balancing usually permits a large degree of unconstrained and 
unstructured discretion.251  
C.   Conclusion #3: Presumptions for Specific Types of Inherently-
Destructive-Conduct Cases Help Constrain Board Member Discretion 
 The Board has appeared to achieve even greater doctrinal consis-
tency in these cases by utilizing a series of fixed balancing ap-
proaches, or presumptions, for deciding specific types of inherently-
destructive-conduct cases. In doing so, the Board has not sought to do 
the impossible by eliminating Member’s decisional discretion; rather, 
it has sought to structure and confine that discretion.252 In particular, 
Laidlaw reinstatement cases, Texaco denial-of-benefit cases, and 
                                                                                                                    
 250. The argument may be made that because only a small percentage of the thou-
sands of unfair labor practice charges actually make it to the Board for resolution, since 
the General Counsel has to first find there has been a violation, it is not surprising that 
the Board, composed of both Democratic and Republican Board Members, finds a large 
number of violations in these cases. However, given the highly indeterminate nature of the 
inherently-destructive-conduct legal standard, a Republican Board Member would seem to 
have a large degree of latitude in manipulating this standard to find the employer conduct 
not violative of the Act, even in situations where the General Counsel is a Republican. Yet, 
this is not the case. Therefore, I believe the better explanation for decisional consistency in 
these cases is the use of presumptions, which by extension support the notion that there is 
an overarching collegiality that pervades the Board’s decisionmaking process. See infra 
Part V.D.  
 251. See Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 420 (1996) (maintaining that balancing in the em-
ployment discrimination arena is inappropriate “because of the danger that decision maker 
bias may affect the outcome”); see also White, supra note 28, at 151 n.284 (arguing that in 
NLRA context, balancing gives a decisionmaker considerable leeway). Professor Grover 
makes an interesting observation when she states, “[r]egardless of the caliber and good 
faith of decisionmakers, problems of bias are likely to occur whenever matters focus on 
race, sex, or other bases of discrimination.” Grover, supra, at 423. Being affiliated with the 
union would appear to be another “form of difference” that “heightens the significance of 
‘tension between formal, predictable rules and individualized judgments under discretion-
ary standards.’” See Grover, supra, at 423 (quoting Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 
1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 26 (1987)).  
 252. See Calvin William Sharpe, “By Any Means Necessary”—Unprotected Conduct and 
Decisional Discretion Under the National Labor Relations Act, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 203, 243 (1999). 
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Harter lockout cases are all cases in which Board Member discretion 
is structured and confined. These cases represent approximately two 
out of every three inherently-destructive-conduct decisions. Over 
time, the Board has decided which types of evidence would lead to an 
employer’s business reasons being deemed legitimate and substan-
tial.  
 For instance, in the Laidlaw reinstatement context, once an eco-
nomic striker has unconditionally offered to return to work, the em-
ployer must reinstate the employee unless there are legitimate and 
substantial reasons for not doing so.253 After many decisions in this 
area of law, it is now clear that there are a limited number of circum-
stances where the employer can refuse reinstatement to the economic 
striker. Such circumstances include instances in which the position 
to which the employee wishes to be reinstated has been eliminated or 
the nature of the position has been significantly modified by the em-
ployer,254 or where the employee seeks a position which is neither his 
or her former job nor a substantially equivalent job.255 Absent these 
circumstances, Board Members from both parties generally agree 
that the employer has violated section 8(a)(3). 
 Indeed, the statistics surrounding Laidlaw-type cases bear out 
this conclusion regarding the consistent manner in which these cases 
are decided. Republican Boards found section 8(a)(3) violations in 
76% of the Laidlaw cases they considered, while Democratic Boards 
found violations in 100% of Laidlaw cases. Although Democratic 
Boards always have found unfair labor practice violations in these 
cases, more surprisingly, Republican Boards have also found viola-
tions in more than three out of every four of these cases. Thus, al-
though one would think that Republican Board Members would util-
ize their discretion in balancing the respective interests to favor em-
ployers when deciding whether employers had met their burden in 
Laidlaw cases, in fact the presumptions have significantly confined 
any such discretion.  
                                                                                                                    
 253. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  
 254. The Fleetwood Trailer court observed that the burden of proving a legitimate and 
substantial justification for not reinstating former economic strikers could be met in cases 
in which there is “the need to adapt to changes in business conditions or to improve effi-
ciency.” See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967); see also Cal. 
Distribution Ctrs., Inc., 308 N.L.R.B. 64, 64 (1992) (“We conclude that the [employer] did 
not violate the Act in [not reinstating employees] because we agree with the [employer] 
that it had legitimate and substantial business justifications for eliminating warehouse-
men positions.”); Salinas Valley Ford Sales, Inc., 279 N.L.R.B. 679, 680-81 (1986) (dealing 
with employer refusal to reinstate former striker supported by legitimate and substantial 
business reasons where employee no longer qualified for the position because of the 
changed nature of its engine repair operations). 
 255. See Rose Printing Co., 304 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1077 (1991) (framing issue as whether 
“strikers are entitled to any jobs for which they are qualified or whether the reinstatement 
obligation extends only to their former jobs or substantially equivalent jobs” and finding 
that employer had legitimate and substantial reasons for not reinstating strikers).  
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 Similarly, in Texaco denial-of-benefit cases, there are only a lim-
ited number of legitimate and substantial business reasons why an 
employer can deny accrued benefits to striking employees.256 These 
reasons involve cases where there exists a strike settlement agree-
ment waiving the rights of strikers to such benefits or cases in which 
the employer has demonstrated reliance on a nondiscriminatory con-
tract interpretation that is “reasonable and . . . arguably correct.”257 
Republican Boards found section 8(a)(3) violations in 53% of Texaco-
type cases, while Democratic Boards found violations in 67% of Tex-
aco-type cases. This significant degree of decisional consistency 
across party lines in these cases results from the fact that Members 
from both parties recognize the same limited types of reasons that 
justify an employer denying accrued benefits to striking employees. 
 Last, similar decisional consistency exists in Harter lockout cases, 
but perhaps for slightly different reasons. In Harter, the Board de-
termined as a matter of law that an employer who locks out its em-
ployees to exert pressure in support of its bargaining position has le-
gitimate and substantial business justifications for hiring temporary 
replacements during the lockout and that the hiring of such tempo-
rary replacements only has a comparatively slight impact on em-
ployee rights under the Act.258 Indeed, in all cases presenting the 
Harter-type scenario the Board found no unfair labor practice on the 
part of the employer, even though Board Members might have dis-
agreed as an initial matter over whether such conduct was supported 
by a sufficient business justification or had an inherently destructive 
impact on employee rights under the Act.259   
                                                                                                                    
 256. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Texaco, Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 241, 246 (1987). 
The employer may meet this burden by proving that a collective-bargaining 
representative has clearly and unmistakably waived its employees’ statutory 
right to be free of such discrimination or coercion. Waiver will not be inferred, 
but must be explicit. If the employer does not seek to prove waiver, it may still 
contest the disabled employee’s continued entitlement to benefits by demon-
strating reliance on a nondiscriminatory contract interpretation that is “rea-
sonable and . . . arguably correct,” and thus sufficient to constitute a legitimate 
and substantial business justification for its conduct. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Noel Foods Div. of the Noel Corp., 315 N.L.R.B. 905, 912 
(1994) (refusal to pay vacation pay to strikers was supported by reasonable and arguably 
correct contract interpretation and, therefore, employer found to have met its burden of 
proving legitimate and substantial reasons for not granting striking employees benefits), 
enforced in part, 82 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Texaco, Inc., 291 N.L.R.B. 325, 326 (1988) 
(reasoning that denial of benefits to strikers was supported by legitimate and substantial 
business reasons because of strike settlement agreement waiving strikers’ rights to bene-
fits). 
 258. See supra note 230.  
 259. Because most of these Harter-type cases occurred in the 1970s and 1980s when 
there were mostly Republican-majority Boards, all such Harter decisions have been made 
by Republican-majority or nonmajority Boards. Initially, Democratic Board Members dis-
sented in many of these cases, see, e.g., Ottawa Silica Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 449 (1972) (Mem-
ber Fanning, dissenting), enforced, 482 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1973), but it appears that at 
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 In short, these presumptions, present in 64% of all inherently-
destructive-conduct decisions analyzed, permit a significant degree of 
decisional consistency in the outcome of these cases even though a 
balancing approach like the one adopted in inherently-destructive-
conduct cases would seem to permit otherwise. This outcome would 
appear to be consistent with how the Board has achieved decisional 
consistency in other section 8(a)(1) contexts, such as in the solicita-
tion and distribution context, where similar presumptions have been 
set up so that the weighing of employer and employee interests in 
such cases occurs in a consistent, predictable, and fair manner.260 
 D.   Conclusion #4: Institutional Collegiality Helps Explain  
    Decisional Consistency in Partisan, Adjudicative    
   Agencies like the NLRB    
 Because of the lack of correlation between the political composi-
tion of the Board and the inherently-destructive-conduct determina-
tion, and because even the discretionary aspects of the legitimate and 
substantial justification standards are structured by presumptions, 
the end result is that Board inherently-destructive-conduct decisions 
are not nearly as politically motivated as historically thought.261 This 
outcome is clearly counterintuitive given the highly indeterminate 
                                                                                                                    
least some Democratic Board Members are now willing to follow Harter’s rationale without 
objection. See Int’l Paper Co., 319 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1266 (1995) (Chairman Gould, a Democ-
rat, acknowledged that an employer may “lawfully lock[ ] out its bargaining unit employees 
and lawfully subcontract[ ] their work on a temporary basis”), enforcement denied, 115 F.3d 
1045 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  
 260. One need only consider the use of the Peyton Packing presumption in solicitation 
and distribution cases to see how Board Member discretion in balancing cases may be ap-
propriately confined. See generally Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992); Beth Is-
rael Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 793 
(1945). These same cases also demonstrate that just because discretion is confined does not 
mean that it is eliminated. Compare Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537-41 (striking section 8(a)(1) 
balance in favor of employer), with Republic Aviation, 324 U.S. at 802-05 (striking section 
8(a)(1) balance in favor of employees and union).  
 261. Indeed, these findings of decisional consistency across party lines are at odds with 
Professor Flynn’s findings that Board Members with management backgrounds (generally 
Republicans) vote decidedly more pro-management, while Members with labor back-
grounds (generally Democrats) do just the opposite. See supra note 7. However, Professor 
Flynn’s findings are based on an analysis of cases in which at least one Board Member dis-
sented. See supra note 7. Although Professor Flynn appears to defend her reliance on these 
statistics based on the assumption that more controversial cases are more important for 
analyzing Board voting behavior, see Flynn, Quiet Revolution, supra note 2, at 1413 n.198, 
this approach understates the amount of decisional consistency that actually exists across 
party lines and between Members with labor backgrounds and management backgrounds. 
For instance, if similar case statistics to those relied on by Professor Flynn were utilized 
for inherently-destructive-conduct cases, only 27% of these cases would actually be ana-
lyzed and an inaccurate, overly polarized view of the Board’s decisionmaking in this area 
would result. By relying only on divided Board decisions to draw larger conclusions about 
the highly polarized nature of the Board, Professor Flynn has essentially put the rabbit in 
the hat.  
2004]                          POLITICS NOT AS USUAL  
 
103
nature of the inherently-destructive-conduct standard which would 
appear to permit political bias to infect the decisions made by deci-
sionmakers ensconced in a politically charged agency environment.262 
 It is this decisional consistency in Board inherently-destructive-
conduct cases which strongly suggests an abiding institutional colle-
giality among Board Members.263 Such collegiality helps maintain the 
impartiality of the Board.264 In other words, the Members of the 
NLRB are able to separate their political and institutional roles and 
do what is best for national labor policy.265 Specifically, Board Mem-
bers have been able to overcome their political biases in the inher-
ently-destructive-conduct context and have agreed (perhaps implic-
itly) to utilize presumptions and other discretion-constraining ana-
                                                                                                                    
 262. The manner in which the Board applies the inherently-destructive-conduct stan-
dard is consistent with Professor Flynn’s observation that “there is often a significant dis-
parity between the Board’s articulated adjudicative standard and its application of that 
standard.” See Flynn, Hiding the Ball, supra note 8, at 393. Professor Flynn refers to this 
dichotomy as “the de jure/de facto gap,” and it “is typified by a test that sounds flexible, but 
that the Board applies in a rigid, near-absolute fashion.” See Flynn, Hiding the Ball, supra 
note 8, at 393-94. Although the Board does not apply its inherently-destructive-conduct 
approach in a rigid, near absolute fashion, nonetheless, the presumptions adopted in these 
cases do appear to lead to decisional consistency across party lines. By engaging in this 
type of analysis, not only is individual Board Member decisional latitude constrained, but 
the Board is able to shield its policy decisions from effective judicial and congressional 
oversight. See Flynn, Hiding the Ball, supra note 8, at 399. Indeed, because the Board has 
already been instructed by the Supreme Court to avoid balancing the relative importance 
of employer and employee economic interests in these types of cases, see supra notes 94-97 
and accompanying text, this de jure/de facto approach may in fact permit the Board to en-
gage in such an analysis in a roundabout way in order to achieve specific policy goals. 
Flynn, Hiding the Ball, supra note 8, at 399; see also White, supra note 28, at 139.  
 263.  See supra note 6.  
 264. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1649 (“The goal is to find the 
best answer (not the best ‘partisan’ answer) to the issues raised.”). 
 265. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1645. Indeed, there is some 
additional empirical evidence that current Board Members are seeking to aspire to this 
concept of collegiality. See Audio tape: A Dialogue with the NLRB, presented by the Ameri-
can Bar Association Section on Labor and Employment Law and the Center for Continuing 
Legal Education (Aug. 10, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dialogue with NLRB].  
Board Member Liebman commented that really, 
the biggest challenge is learning to form the personal associations with your 
colleagues, so that we can work together to try to see old things new ways . . . . 
That really is the biggest challenge: How do we learn to listen to each other and 
learn from each other and how do we figure out how to apply this law and en-
force this law in a way that makes sense? 
Id.  (comments of Member Liebman).  Former Board Member Acosta commented: 
On the Supreme Court, even though you have some vigorous disagreements, 
there is a great deal of collegiality because they know they have to work to-
gether and do work together . . . . This is . . . something that the Board works 
on, but something that I think the Board needs to continue to work on and in 
the big picture sense, knowing the role of Members is probably the biggest chal-
lenge.  
Id. (comments of Member Acosta). Chairman Battista stated that “while we are getting to 
know one another, I think we’ve been collegial; that has been a goal of ours and to date, 
we’ve disagreed, but we haven’t been disagreeable in doing it.” Id. (comments of Chairman 
Battista). 
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lytical devices to help achieve decisional consistency in this highly 
indeterminate area of labor law and, thereby, support the institu-
tional integrity of the Board. And there is reason to believe that if 
collegiality assists the Board in obtaining a good amount of deci-
sional consistency in this area of labor law, those same collegial im-
pulses should animate Board decisionmaking in other areas as 
well.266 
 Some may suggest that the Board is just giving structure to vague 
standards and then treating like cases alike, and that this is not a 
sign of collegiality at all, but rather responsible decisionmakers ap-
plying well-known principles of stare decisis in the agency environ-
ment. Yet, the Board, as is apparent by its constant policy flip-flops 
over the years,267 has never expressly embraced the concept of stare 
decisis.268 In any event, the highly indeterminate nature of the inher-
ently-destructive-conduct standard would appear to permit the most 
partisan Board Members plenty of wiggle room to justify outcomes 
consistent with their personal policy preferences if something else 
were not constraining their discretion. The results of this empirical 
study suggest that institutional concerns better explain why the 
Board is able to achieve decisional consistency in an area of labor law 
ripe for political factionalism.269 
 Nevertheless, in order to more concretely establish that Board 
Members and other agency adjudicators are engaging in collegial de-
cisionmaking, further empirical studies of other seemingly malleable 
legal standards are needed.270 The broader implications of such stud-
                                                                                                                    
 266. For example, the same impulses appear to exist in the solicitation and distribu-
tion context. See supra note 260. 
 267. See Dialogue with NLRB, supra note 265 (“Flip-flopping in Board precedent . . . is 
something that just happens; it is part of the statutory scheme; it is part of what happens 
with the appointment process and precedent has flipped-flopped over the years.” (com-
ments of Member Liebman)).  
 268. See Dialogue with NLRB, supra note 265.  Board Member Liebman stated that, 
We should really stop asking the question about stare decisis and we should 
stop asking that until we are prepared to issue a decision which says that even 
though we don’t like this precedent we are going to adhere to it because of stare 
decisis. And if the [sic] labor and management are really as interested in stare 
decisis because of the stability it brings to the parties, then they should stop 
asking us to revisit precedent every time the politics change. 
Id. (comments of Member Liebman); see also Sarah Pawlicki, Levitz Furniture Co.: The 
End of Celanese and the Good-Faith Doubt Standard for Withdrawing Recognition of In-
cumbent Unions, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 381, 403 (2003).  
 269. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1645; Dialogue with NLRB, 
supra note 265. Although there are certainly differences in the way that appellate judges 
and agency decisionmakers decide cases, there appears to be enough similarity between 
the two to make Judge Edwards’ conception of collegiality meaningful for agency adjudica-
tors, like the Members of the NLRB. Nonetheless, further study of this analogy is neces-
sary to determine whether it is in fact appropriate to apply Judge Edwards’ theory of ap-
pellate court collegiality to quasi-judicial administrative agencies.  
 270. At least one other empirical analysis, conducted by Professor LeRoy, has found 
similar decisional consistency in Board adjudications in the midst of flexible standards. See 
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ies could be far-reaching. Nothing less than the conception of admin-
istrative agencies as governmental bodies festering with Machiavel-
lian intrigue could be at stake. Perhaps more significantly, if future 
studies of agency adjudication similarly point to institutional collegi-
ality playing a significant role in how agency cases are decided, these 
findings would have the happy effect of bolstering the credibility of 
administrative agencies, like the NLRB, in the eyes of those who 
seek impartial justice from their pronouncements.271 From this au-
thor’s perspective, such a conception of administrative agencies, 
striving to get the law right in highly partisan environments, is long 
overdue.272 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 This Article’s empirical analysis of the National Labor Relations 
Board’s inherently-destructive-conduct decisions strongly suggests 
that the Board is less politically motivated in adjudicating labor dis-
putes than previous commentators have suspected. These findings 
indicate that such decisional consistency results from the effect of in-
stitutional collegiality, which permits Board Members from all ideo-
logical perspectives to decide cases solely on their legal merits and 
with the sole goal of getting the law right. Further empirical analy-
ses of both National Labor Relations Board and other adjudicative 
administrative agency’s decisionmaking should be conducted both to 
                                                                                                                    
LeRoy, Institutional Signals, supra note 9, at 222 (finding through empirical study a phe-
nomenally stable rate of unfair labor practice strike rulings over a fifty year-time period); 
cf. Brudney et al., supra note 171, at 1738 (finding that political party was not monolithic 
in predicting how appellate judges would vote in labor law cases). Not only are further 
studies of agency adjudication required in the context of the NLRB, but similar empirical 
studies should also be conducted for other federal administrative agencies that engage in 
policymaking through adjudication and also operate in highly partisan atmospheres. The 
Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Bureau of Im-
migration Appeals, and the Federal Election Commission are four such federal agencies for 
whom findings of collegial decisionmaking could have beneficial effects. 
 271. See Craver, supra note 159, at 126 (“As long as individuals who are as knowledge-
able and fair-minded as these persons [on the Clinton Board] continue to occupy Board po-
sitions, labor and management representatives and individual employees can be confident 
of the independence and judiciousness of that agency.”); see also Brownstone, supra note 
12, at 244.  
 272. See Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 6, at 1679. 
Getting the law right is the mission of a truly collegial court. . . . In due course, 
new judges on a truly collegial court come to appreciate that judges all have a 
common interest, as members of the institution of the judiciary, in getting the 
law right, and that, as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be per-
suaded, all in an atmosphere of civility and respect. 
Id. Although this Article maintains that the analogy between appellate judges and agency 
adjudicators is an apt one as far as institutional collegiality is concerned, it is clear that 
the Members of the Board have not always treated one another with civility and respect. 
See generally GOULD, supra note 171. Perhaps, an increased recognition among Board 
Members of the underlying collegiality that informs their decisionmaking will lead to an 
atmosphere of increased civility and respect. 
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substantiate the role of collegiality in agency adjudications and, per-
haps more importantly, to bolster the public’s confidence in the in-
tegrity of the administrative state and its processes. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
CASE STATISTICS DERIVED FROM 
INHERENTLY-DESTRUCTIVE-CONDUCT EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Legend 
L/S - legitimate and substantial business justifications 
ID - inherently destructive impact 
CS - comparatively slight impact 
WL - Wright Line/specific evidence case 
ULP – unfair labor practice 
 
 
1.  Overall Number of Cases with ID Analysis: 140 
* Number of ID Decisions is 144 because 4 cases have more than one sce-
nario represented (see footnote 197 and accompanying text). 
 
2.  Average Number of ID Decisions Per Year Since Great Dane: 4 decisions 
 
3.  Number and Percentages of Different Types of Scenarios in ID Decisions: 
    Scenario 1: 69 (48%) 
    Scenario 2: 27 (19%) 
    Scenario 3: 48 (33%) 
    Scenario 4: 0 (0%)  
 
4.  Number and Percentages of Political Party Decisions: 
  Republican Board Majority ID decisions: 79 (55% of all cases) 
    Scenario 1: 34 (43%) 
    Scenario 2: 9 (11%)  
    Scenario 3: 36 (46%)   
  Democratic Board Majority ID decisions: 62 (43% of all cases) 
    Scenario 1: 35 (56%) 
    Scenario 2: 18 (29%) 
    Scenario 3: 9 (15%) 
  Non-majority ID decisions (2-2 split): 3 (2% of all cases) 
    Scenario 1: 0 (0%) 
    Scenario 2: 0 (0%) 
    Scenario 3: 3 (100%) 
 
5.    Specific Types of Scenario 1 Decisions (71 Decisions):  
  Laidlaw-Type Reinstatement Decisions: 36 (51%) 
    Republican Decisions: 16 (44%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 20 (56%) 
  Texaco-Type Denial of Benefit Decisions: 22 (31%) 
    Republican Decisions: 16 (73%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 6 (27%) 
  Neither Laidlaw, Texaco or Harter Decisions: 13 (18%) 
  Scenario 1 Laidlaw and Texaco Decisions as Percentage of Overall Decisions:  
  58 out of 144 decisions (40%) 
    Republican Decisions: 32 out of 79 (41%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 26 out of 62 (42%)  
* There were 2 cases where there was both a Scenario 1 Laidlaw and Tex-
aco finding. For purposes of analysis, these decisions were counted once 
each as both Texaco and Laidlaw cases. This explains why there are a 
total of 71 Scenario 1 decisions, rather than 69 decisions when the deci-
sions are grouped in this manner (see footnote 215 and accompanying 
text). 
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6.   Specific Types of Scenario 3 Decisions (48 Decisions):  
  Laidlaw-Type Reinstatement Decisions: 5 (11%) 
    Republican Decisions: 5 (100%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 0 (0%) 
  Texaco-Type Denial of Benefit Decisions:  17 (35%) 
    Republican Decisions: 14 (82%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 3 (18%) 
  Harter-Type Lock Out Decisions: 13 (27%) 
    Republican Decisions: 12 (92%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 1 (8%) 
  Neither Laidlaw, Texaco or Harter Decisions: 13 (27%) 
  Scenario 3 Laidlaw, Texaco, and Harter Decisions as Percentage of Overall  
  Decisions: 35 out of 144 decisions (24%) 
    Republican Decisions: 31 out of 79 decisions (39%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 4 out of 62 decisions (6%) 
* Only 2 cases were both L/S and ID. In all remaining cases where a L/S 
reason was found, the conduct was found to be CS (see footnotes 218, 
225 and accompanying text).  
 
7.  Overall Laidlaw and Texaco Case-By-Case Scenario: 
  Laidlaw Cases (41 cases overall):  
    Scenario 1: 36 (88%) 
    Scenario 3: 5 (12%) 
  Texaco Cases (39 cases overall): 
    Scenario 1: 22 (56%) 
    Scenario 3: 17 (44%) 
 
8.  Overall Laidlaw, Texaco, and Harter as Percentage of Overall Cases: 93 out of  
  144 decisions (65%) 
    Republican Decisions: 63 out of 79 decisions (80%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 30 out of 62 decisions (48%) 
 
9.  Specific Types of Scenario 2 Decisions (27 Decisions):  
    Conclusory ID Findings or No L/S Analysis: 10 (37%) (overall - 7%) 
    Both ID and No L/S in Same Opinion: 12 (44%) (overall - 8%) 
    Both Anti-Union Intent and ID Finding (Hedge): 6 (22%) (overall - 4%) 
    Both L/S found and ID found: 2 (7%) (overall - 1%) 
* Some Scenario 2 decisions are in more than one category. 
 
10.  Overall Case Outcomes by Political Party (ULP or no ULP): 
    ULP Found (Scenario 1 + Scenario 2): 96 out of 144 decisions (67%) 
    Republican Decisions: 43 out of 79 decisions (54%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 53 out of 62 decisions (85%) 
    ULP Not Found (Scenario 3): 48 out of 144 decisions (33%) 
    Republican Decisions: 36 out of 79 decisions (46%) 
    Democrat Decisions: 9 out of 62 decisions (15%) 
 
11.  Board ID Cases Without Unanimity (Concurrences and Dissents): 51 (36%) 
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12.  Statistics Concerning Number of Dissents: 
    Board ID Cases with Dissents: 39 (28%) 
    Republican Dissents: 28 (20%) 
     Scenario 1: 6 (22%) (overall - 4%) 
     Scenario 2: 11 (39%) (overall - 8%) 
     Scenario 3: 11 (39%) (overall - 8%) 
    Democrat Dissents: 16 (11%) 
     Scenario 1: 2 (12.5%) (overall - 1%) 
     Scenario 2: 2 (12.5%) (overall - 1%) 
     Scenario 3: 12 (75%) (overall - 9%) 
 
13.  Statistics Concerning Number of Concurrences: 
  Board ID Cases with Concurrences: 17 (12%) 
    Republican Concurrences: 11 (8%) 
     Scenario 1: 4 (36%) (overall - 3%) 
     Scenario 2: 2 (18%) (overall - 1%) 
     Scenario 3: 5 (46%) (overall - 4%) 
    Democrat Concurrences: 7 (5%) 
     Scenario 1: 3 (42%) (overall - 2%) 
     Scenario 2: 2 (29%) (overall - 1%) 
     Scenario 3: 2 (29%) (overall - 1%) 
* More combined Republican and Democrat concurrences than total num-
ber of concurrence cases because some cases have both Republican and 
Democrats concurring. 
 
14.  Overall Number of Appeals From Board ID Cases: 58 (41%) 
 
15.  Statistics Concerning Number of Board ID Cases Enforced or Review Denied: 
  Board ID Cases Enforced or Review Denied: 35 (60%) (overall - 25%) 
    Democrat Majority Enforced: 21 (60%) (overall - 15%) 
     Scenario 1: 12 (57%) (overall - 8%) 
     Scenario 2: 6 (29%) (overall - 4%) 
     Scenario 3: 3 (14%) (overall - 2%) 
    Republican Majority Enforced: 13 (37%) (overall - 9%) 
     Scenario 1: 8 (62%) (overall - 6%) 
     Scenario 2: 0 (0%) (overall - 0%) 
     Scenario 3: 5 (38%) (overall - 4%) 
    No Majority: 1 (3%) (overall - 1%) 
     Scenario 3: 1 (100%) (overall - 1%) 
 
16.  Statistics Concerning Number of Board ID Cases Denied Enforcement or Vacated: 
  Board ID Cases Denied Enforcement or Vacated: 23 (40%) (overall - 16%) 
    Democrat Majority Not Enforced: 12 (52%) (overall - 9%) 
     Scenario 1: 6 (50%) (overall - 4%) 
     Scenario 2: 4 (33%) (overall - 3%) 
     Scenario 3: 2 (17%) (overall - 1%) 
    Republican Majority Not Enforced: 11 (48%) (overall - 8%) 
     Scenario 1: 3 (27%) (overall - 2%) 
     Scenario 2: 4 (36.5 %) (overall - 3%) 
     Scenario 3: 4 (36.5%) (overall - 3%) 
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17.  Individual Board Member Statistics: 
  Overall Individual ID Decisions: 467 decisions (1 - 209 (45%); 2 - 88 (19%); 3 - 165 
(35%); 4 - 0 (0%); other - 5 (1%)) 
  Total Board Members Deciding ID Cases: 34 members 
  Democrat Board Members: 15 (44%) - Member Zimmerman counted as De-
mocrat even though listed as an Independent (see note 200). 
1. Liebman: 12 decisions (1 - 8 (67%); 2 - 3 (25%); 3 - 1 (8%))  
2. Walsh: 5 decisions (1 - 2 (40%); 2 - 3 (60%); 3 - 0 (0%)) 
3. Truesdale: 18 decisions (1 - 7 (39%); 2 - 8 (44%); 3 - 3 (17%)) 
4. Fox: 4 decisions (1 - 4 (100%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 0 (0%)) 
5. Gould: 10 decisions (1 - 4 (40%); 2 - 3 (30%); 3 - 2 (20%); other (WL 
case) - 1 (10%)) 
6. Browning: 4 decisions (1 - 2 (50%); 2 - 2 (50%); 3 - 0 (0%)) 
7. Devaney: 12 decisions (1 - 5 (42%); 2 - 1 (8%); 3 - 6 (50%)) 
8. Cracraft: 16 decisions (1 - 8 (50%); 2 - 1 (6%); 3 - 7 (44%)) 
9. Babson: 27 decisions (1 - 9 (33%); 2 - 1 (4%); 3 - 17 (63%)) 
10. Dennis: 8 decisions (1 - 5 (62.5%); 2 - 1 (12.5%); 3 - 2 (25%)) 
11. Zimmerman (I): 11 decisions (1 - 8 (73%); 2 - 2 (18%); 3 - 1 (9%)) 
12. Fanning: 50 decisions (1 - 28 (56%); 2 - 18 (36%); 3 - 4 (8%)) 
13. Penello: 32 decisions (1 - 10 (31%); 2 - 10 (31%); 3 - 12 (38%)) 
14. Brown: 10 decisions (1 - 6 (60%); 2 - 2 (20%); 3 - 2 (20%)) 
15. McCulloch: 5 decisions (1 - 3 (60%); 2 - 1 (20%); 3 - 1 (20%)) 
Overall Democratic Individual ID Decisions: 224 (48%); (1 - 109 (49%); 
2 - 56 (25%); 3 - 58 (26%); other – 1 (0%)) 
    Republican Board Members: 19 (56%) 
1. Battista: 2 decisions (1 - 2 (100%) ; 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 0 (0%)) 
2. Schaumber: 1 decision (1 - 1 (100%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 – 0 (0%)) 
3. Hurtgen: 9 decisions (1 - 2 (22%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 6 (67%); other (no 
discrimination) - 1 (11%)) 
4. Brame: 1 decision (1 - 0 (0%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 1 (100%)) 
5. Higgins: 2 decisions (1 - 1 (50%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 1 (50%)) 
6. Cohen: 3 decisions (1 - 1 (33%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 1 (33%); other (WL 
case) - 1 (33%)) 
7. Stephens: 40 decisions (1 - 19 (48%); 2 - 3 (8%); 3 - 17 (43%); other 
- 1 (1%)) 
8. Raudabaugh: 8 decisions (1 - 3 (37.5%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 4 (50%); 
other - 1 (12.5%)) 
9. Oviatt: 6 decisions (1 - 4 (67%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 2 (33%)) 
10. Johansen: 42 decisions (1 - 19 (45%); 2 - 1 (2%); 3 - 22 (52%)) 
11. Dotson: 26 decisions (1 - 10 (38%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 16 (62%)) 
12. Hunter: 7 decisions (1 - 1 (14%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 6 (86%)) 
13. Jenkins: 48 decisions (1 - 25 (52%); 2 - 20 (42%); 3 - 3 (6%)) 
14. Van de Water: 2 decisions (1 - 0 (0%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 2 (100%)) 
15. Murphy: 14 decisions (1 - 4 (28%) ; 2 - 5 (36%); 3 - 5 (36%)) 
16. Walther: 3 decisions (1 - 0 (0%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 3 (100%)) 
17. Kennedy: 11 decisions (1 - 2 (18%); 2 - 2 (18%); 3 - 7 (64%)) 
18. Miller: 14 decisions (1 - 4 (28%); 2 - 0 (0%); 3 - 10 (72%)) 
19. Zagoria: 4 decisions (1 - 2 (50%); 2 - 1 (25%); 3 - 1 (25%)) 
Overall Republican Individual ID Decisions: 243 (52%); (1 - 100 (41%); 
2 - 32 (13%); 3 -107 (44%); other - 4 (2%))  
* These calculations take into account individual decisions in dissent 
(see footnote 175 and accompanying text). 
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18.  Chronological Statistics (By Decade and Board): 
  By Decade 
a. 2000s Decisions: 9 decisions (6%) (1 - 4 (44%); 2 - 3 (33%); 3 - 2 (23%)) 
b. 1990s Decisions: 25 decisions (17%) (1 - 13 (52%); 2 - 4 (16%); 3 - 8 
(32%)) 
c.  1980s Decisions: 62 decisions (43%) (1 - 32 (52%); 2 - 4 (6%); 3 - 26 
(42%)) 
d. 1970s Decisions: 42 decisions (29%) (1 - 17 (40%); 2 - 15 (36%); 3 - 10 
(24%)) 
e. 1960s Decisions: 6 decisions (4%) (1- 3 (50%); 2 - 1 (17%); 3 - 2 (33%)) 
  By Board 
a. Bush Jr. Board (Jan. 2001 - Oct. 2003): 7 decisions (5%) (1 - 3 (43%); 2 - 
3 (43%); 3 - 1 (14%)) 
b. Clinton Board (Jan. 1993 - Dec. 2000): 16 decisions (11%) (1 - 8 (50%); 2 
- 3 (19%); 3 - 5 (31%)) 
c. Bush Sr. Board (Jan. 1989 - Dec. 1992): 17 decisions (12%) (1 - 11 
(65%); 2 - 1 (6%); 3 - 5 (29%)) 
d. Reagan Board (Jan. 1981 - Dec. 1988): 50 decisions (35%) (1 - 22 (44%); 
2 - 3 (6%); 3 - 25 (50%)) 
e. Carter Board (Jan. 1977 - Dec. 1980): 23 decisions (16%) (1 - 11 (48%); 2 
- 10 (43%); 3 - 2 (9%)) 
f. Ford Board (Aug. 1974 - Dec. 1976): 6 decisions (4%) (1 - 2 (33%); 2 - 3 
(50%); 3 - 1 (17%)) 
g. Nixon Board (Jan. 1969 - July 1974): 19 decisions (13%) (1 - 9 (47%); 2 - 
3 (16%); 3 - 7 (37%)) 
h. Johnson Board (Jun. 1967 - Dec. 1968): 6 decisions (4%) (1 - 3 (50%); 2 - 
1 (17%); 3 - 2 (33%))  
* Johnson Board is only considered from time of Great Dane deci-
sion (June 12, 1967) and forward.  
 
 
